Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"When a train of ideas is very familiar to the mind, they often follow one another in the memory without any laborious recollection, and so as to arise almost instantaneously and mechanically; as in writing, singing, &c. the traces between them being worn like beaten roads."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"The analogy upon this hypothesis between sensation and memory, the one arising from impressions made on the brain, the other depending on traces continued there."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"Mr. Locke accounts for the association of ideas, which is the cause of antipathies and many errors, with, other strange phænomena, by memory; supposing such traces are worn on the brain as unite ideas, so that when the mind turns to one it should almost necessarily fall on the other too."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"When actual thought is suspended, there may remain some secret power of thinking resulting from the constitution of the soul, which will exert itself when the obstruction is removed. As a bow when bent has a disposition to straiten itself again, or a clock to strike, though the hammer be held ba...

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"That mind is said to be possessed of NATURAL LIBERTY, or liberty of choice, which is so constituted, as that its volitions shall not be invincibly determined by any foreign cause or consideration whatever offered to it, but by its own sovereign pleasure."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY consists in a prevailing disposition to act according to the dictates of reason; i. e. in such a manner, as shall, all things considered, most effectually promote our happiness. A disposition to act contrary to this is MENTAL SERVITUDE: and when the mind is equally...

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"To the fourth argument (which is generally called choice εν αδιαφορια) 'tis answered by the opposers of natural liberty, that no such case can occur that two objects should appear entirely equal: and if there did, then a choice would be impossible; for that would imply an effect withou...

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"But this is evidently taking the question for granted: for it will not be allowed that willing is a necessary effect, which must imply a compelling efficient cause; or the mind like a balance to be moved with weights."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"That perhaps this may be a state of imprisonment to the soul, as many of the philosophers thought; and that when it is set at liberty from the body, it may obtain new and noble ways of perception and action, to us at present unknown."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)