Date: w. 350 B.C.

The soul "is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"Voice is a kind of sound characteristic of what has soul in it; nothing that is without soul utters voice, it being only by a metaphor that we speak of the voice of a flute or the lyre or generally of what (being without soul) possesses the power of producing a succession of notes which differ i...

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"The process [of thinking] is like that in which the air modifies the pupil in this or that way and the pupil transmits the modification to some third thing (and similarly in hearing), while the ultimate point of arrival is one, a single mean, with different manners of being."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"This is what led Democritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul, and compares them to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"The doctrine of the Pythagoreans seems to rest upon the same ideas; some of them declared the motes in air, others what moved them, to be soul."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of ...

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"The process of movement stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of the percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a seal."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"This explains why, in those who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no memory is formed; just as no impression would be formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge on running water; while there are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being frayed, as happens t...

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

Date: w. 350 B.C.

"The former are too moist, the latter too hard, so that in the case of the former the image does not remain in the soul, while on the latter it is not imprinted at all."

— Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)