Locke, John (1632-1704)

An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding

London

1690, 1694, 1695, 1700, 1706

"This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like bright Sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear light of it."

1. ALL our Knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the Mind has of its own Ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest Certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of Knowledge, are capable of; it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its Evidence. The different clearness of our Knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of Thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives, that White is not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the Ideas together, by bare Intuition, without the intervention of any other Idea; and this kind of Knowledge is the clearest and most certain, that humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like bright Sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. 'Tis on this intuition, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our knowledge, which Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater Certainty, than to know that any Idea in his Mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two Ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shews only that he has a mind to be a Sceptick, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this Intuition, that in the next degree of Knowledge, which I call Demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty.
(IV.ii.1)

Light::Sun::Sunshine

Reading S. H. Clark's "Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered" in JHI59:2 (1998), 261.

Locke began composition as early as 1671 (Drafts A and B).

I find over 25 entries in the ESTC (1690, 1694, 1695, 1700, 1706, 1710, 1715, 1721, 1726, 1731, 1735, 1741, 1748, 1753, 1759, 1760, 1765, 1768, 1775, 1777, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1795, 1796, 1798). See also the many abridgements issued in the period.

First published as An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding. In Four Books. (London: Printed by Eliz. Holt, for Thomas Basset, at the George in Fleetstreet, near St. Dunstan's Church, 1690). <Link to EEBO><EEBO-TCP>

Searching first in a Past Masters edition based on the 12th Edition of Locke's Works and proofread against the 1959 Fraser edition. More recent searches in EEBO-TCP.

Reading John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford, Oxford UP, 1975)--against which I have checked the text searched in Past Masters. Note, Nidditch's text is based on 4th ed. of 1700.

09/06/2003

06/04/2010