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"The Obligation arises no otherwise from the Love of our Happiness, than the Truth of Propositions concerning the Existence of Things natural, and of their First Cause, which is thence discover'd, arises from the Credit given to the Testimony of our Senses."

— Cumberland, Richard (1632-1718)

Author

Cumberland, Richard (1632-1718)

Work Title

De legibus naturae [A Treatise of the Laws of Nature]

Date

1672, 1727

Metaphor

"The Obligation arises no otherwise from the Love of our Happiness, than the Truth of Propositions concerning the Existence of Things natural, and of their First Cause, which is thence discover'd, arises from the Credit given to the Testimony of our Senses."

Metaphor in Context

First then I am to observe, "That natural Obligation is not discover'd by Man in the same Order, in which it is founded and establish'd in Nature by the Author thereof." We are under the necessity of first using the Analytical Method, by rising from those Effects which immediately affect us, to various and very complicated second Causes, 'till at length we arrive at the First. But we are by no means injurious to him, if at the End of our inquiries we acknowledge, "That all those necessary Effects which we had before observ'd, ow'd their Original to his Will; and, if we refer to him all that Perfection, which we had taken notice of in them." So, with respect to our present Subject, we have first "some Knowledge of our own Nature, and of the Necessity of some things to its Happiness, and of some plainly natural Propensions and Endeavours to obtain such Necessaries." We then observe, "That some free Actions of ours are, whether we will or no, naturally oppos'd and restrain'd, as far as in them lies, by those with whom we have to do; while others of our Actions (such as are beneficial to others) are chearfully recompens'd with reciprocal Affection"; we further perceive "ourselves so fram'd by Nature, that we incline, with out deliberation, to repel Force with Force, and, to return Like for Like"; nor does the most consummate Reason dictate otherwise. From innumerable and perpetual Observations of this kind, and others that I have before suggested, the Mind of Man becomes persuaded, "That the Benevolence of each towards all paves the way to the Rewards and Happiness of all other Men alike; and that so much the more, by how much it is the more diffusive." When afterwards the Mind considers, "That this is all effected by the most provident Author of Nature," it cannot doubt, "But that he would have this regarded by Men, as it really is, to be a sufficient Argument afforded by the supreme Governor of the World, to incline them to the exercise of Universal Benevolence": That is, (as I have shewn,) as a Proof of our Obligation, and a certain Mark of the Law enjoining it. Altho', therefore, this be last discover'd, yet here the Obligation of the Laws of Nature takes its first Rise, namely, from the Discovery of the Will of God, whom, from his Works, we had learn'd to be a most perfect Being, the Cause of all Things, upon whose Pleasure depends the whole Happiness of All, and consequently our own, concerning which we are naturally most solicitous. The Obligation arises no otherwise from the Love of our own Happiness, than the Truth of Propositions concerning the Existence of Things natural, and of their First Cause, which is thence discover'd, arises from the Credit given to the Testimony of our Senses. Yet no-one would say, "That we, therefore, preferred our Senses to the whole World, and to God himself"; since we readily acknowledge, "That their very Existence, and all their Use, depends upon God as their First Cause, and upon the System of the World, as upon Causes subordinate to him." That is first in Nature, at which we arrive last in this inverted Method of Reasoning. Therefore, altho' this Method of coming at Knowledge, be evidently natural and very common; altho' our Passions also, and several Appetites, are excited according to the discoveries we make of Good and Evil; yet we may not, therefore, thence affirm, what is most worthy to be known, or amiable above all other things. But, as by the help of our Senses, we learn some very general Principles, (as for Example, the most universal Theorems of Arithmetick and Geometry,) whereby we may successfully correct those Errors, which the generality are wont to imbibe from misapprehended Sensations; in like manner, from the Love of our own Happiness, under the conduct of Prudence, all who are truly Rational attain such a Knowledge of Natural Things and of God himself, and such Affections towards his Honour, and the Common Happiness of all, as either prevent or root out all perverse Self-Love: Those, (or at least some of those,) first Natural and Necessary Appetites, which we suppose in Men, of procuring their own Preservation and Happiness, are confin'd within a very narrow compass, and are perfectly free from Fault; as our simple Sensations, with respect to the proper objects of our Senses, under proper Regulations, are free from Error. Which were it otherwise, there would be no hope left, either of knowing Nature, or of conforming our Actions to the Laws of Nature; but a fruitless and perpetual Scepticism would be necessarily introduc'd into the place of Science, and a casual Determination of our Actions into that of Prudence, and the regular Conduct of our Passions; and there would be no difference between the Wise Man and the Fool.
(V.xlv, pp. 606-8)