"Regard to the sentiments of other people, however, comes afterwards both to enforce and to direct the practice of all those virtues; and no man during, either the whole of his life, or that of any considerable part of it, ever trod steadily and uniformly in the paths of prudence, of justice, or of proper beneficence, whose conduct was not principally directed by a regard to the sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct."

— Smith, Adam (1723-1790)


Place of Publication
London and Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed for A. Strahan; and A. Cadell in the Strand; and W. Creech, and J. Bell & Co. at Edinburgh
Date
1790
Metaphor
"Regard to the sentiments of other people, however, comes afterwards both to enforce and to direct the practice of all those virtues; and no man during, either the whole of his life, or that of any considerable part of it, ever trod steadily and uniformly in the paths of prudence, of justice, or of proper beneficence, whose conduct was not principally directed by a regard to the sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct."
Metaphor in Context
Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and beneficence; of which, the one restrains us from hurting, the other prompts us to promote that happiness. Independent of any regard either to what are, or to what ought to be, or to what upon a certain condition would be, the sentiments of other people, the first of those three virtues is originally recommended to us by our selfish, the other two by our benevolent affections. Regard to the sentiments of other people, however, comes afterwards both to enforce and to direct the practice of all those virtues; and no man during, either the whole of his life, or that of any considerable part of it, ever trod steadily and uniformly in the paths of prudence, of justice, or of proper beneficence, whose conduct was not principally directed by a regard to the sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. If in the course of the day we have swerved in any respect from the rules which he prescribes to us; if we have either exceeded or relaxed in our frugality; if we have either exceeded or relaxed in our industry; if, through passion or inadvertency, we have hurt in any respect the interest or happiness of our neighbour; if we have neglected a plain and proper opportunity of promoting that interest and happiness; it is this inmate who, in the evening, calls us to an account for all those omissions and violations, and his reproaches often make us blush inwardly both for our folly and inattention to our own happiness, and for our still greater indifference and inattention, perhaps, to that of other people.
(text from http://www.econlib.org, VI.iii.54; cf. p. 262 in Liberty Fund ed.)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
At least 4 entries in the ESTC (1790, 1792, 1793, 1797).

Text checked against The Theory of Moral Sentiments; or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. To Which Is Added, A Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. by Adam Smith, LL. D. Fellow of the Royal Societies of London and Edinburgh; One of the Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs in Scotland; and Formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. The Sixth Edition, With Considerable Additions and Corrections. In two volumes. (London: Printed for A. Strahan; and A. Cadell in the Strand; and W. Creech, and J. Bell & Co. at Edinburgh, 1790). <Link to ESTC>
Date of Entry
06/19/2014

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.