"He does not, in this case, perfectly identify himself with the ideal man within the breast, he does not become himself the impartial spectator of his own conduct."

— Smith, Adam (1723-1790)


Place of Publication
London and Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed for A. Strahan; and A. Cadell in the Strand; and W. Creech, and J. Bell & Co. at Edinburgh
Date
1790
Metaphor
"He does not, in this case, perfectly identify himself with the ideal man within the breast, he does not become himself the impartial spectator of his own conduct."
Metaphor in Context
In such paroxysms of distress, if I may be allowed to call them so, the wisest and firmest man, in order to preserve his equanimity, is obliged, I imagine, to make a considerable, and even a painful exertion. His own natural feeling of his own distress, his own natural view of his own situation, presses hard upon him, and he cannot, without a very great effort, fix his attention upon that of the impartial spectator. Both views present themselves to him at the same time. His sense of honour, his regard to his own dignity, directs him to fix his whole attention upon the one view. His natural, his untaught and undisciplined feelings, are continually calling it off to the other. He does not, in this case, perfectly identify himself with the ideal man within the breast, he does not become himself the impartial spectator of his own conduct. The different views of both characters exist in his mind separate and distinct from one another, and each directing him to a behaviour different from that to which the other directs him. When he follows that view which honour and dignity point out to him, Nature does not, indeed, leave him without a recompense. He enjoys his own complete self-approbation, and the applause of every candid and impartial spectator. By her unalterable laws, however, he still suffers; and the recompense which she bestows, though very considerable, is not sufficient completely to compensate the sufferings which those laws inflict. Neither is it fit that it should. If it did completely compensate them, he could, from self-interest, have no motive for avoiding an accident which must necessarily diminish his utility both to himself and to society; and Nature, from her parental care of both, meant that he should anxiously avoid all such accidents. He suffers, therefore, and though, in the agony of the paroxysm, he maintains, not only the manhood of his countenance, but the sedateness and sobriety of his judgment, it requires his utmost and most fatiguing exertions, to do so.
(text from from econlib.org, III.i.70; cf. p. 148 in Liberty Fund ed.)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
At least 4 entries in the ESTC (1790, 1792, 1793, 1797).

Text checked against The Theory of Moral Sentiments; or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. To Which Is Added, A Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. by Adam Smith, LL. D. Fellow of the Royal Societies of London and Edinburgh; One of the Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs in Scotland; and Formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. The Sixth Edition, With Considerable Additions and Corrections. In two volumes. (London: Printed for A. Strahan; and A. Cadell in the Strand; and W. Creech, and J. Bell & Co. at Edinburgh, 1790). <Link to ESTC>
Date of Entry
06/19/2014

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.