Smith, Adam (1723-1790)

The Theory of Moral Sentiments [2nd ed.]

London and Edinburgh

Printed for A. Millar, in the Strand; and A. Kincaid and J. Bell, in Edinburgh

1761

"In order to defend ourselves from such partial judgments, we soon learn to set up in our own minds a judge between ourselves and those we live with."

[...] In order to defend ourselves from such partial judgments, we soon learn to set up in our own minds a judge between ourselves and those we live with. We conceive ourselves as acting in the presence of a person quite candid and equitable, of one who has no particular relation either to ourselves, or to those whose interested are affected by our conduct, who is neither father, nor brother, nor friend either to them or to us, but is merely a man in general, an impartial spectator who considers our conduct with the same indifference with which we regard that of other people. If, when we place ourselves in the situation of such a person, our own actions appear to us under an agreeable aspect, if we feel that such a spectator cannot avoid entering into all the motives which influenced us, whatever may be the judgments of the world, we must still be pleased with our own behaviour, and regard ourselves, in spite of the censure of our companions, as the just and proper objects of approbation.
(pp. 207-8; cf. p. 129n. in Liberty Fund ed.)

Government::Judge

Reading

9 entries in the ESTC (1761, 1764, 1767, 1774, 1777, 1781, 1790, 1792, 1793, 1797).

Text from The Theory of Moral Sentiments. By Adam Smith, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. 2nd ed. (London: Printed for A. Millar, in the Strand; and A. Kincaid and J. Bell, in Edinburgh, 1761). <Link to ESTC><Link to Google Books>

Reading Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984).

06/19/2014