"The great judge of the world, has, for the wisest reasons, thought proper to interpose, between the weak eye of reason, and the throne of his eternal justice, a degree of obscurity and darkness, which though it does not intirely cover the great tribunal from the view of mankind, yet renders the impression of it faint and feeble in comparison of what might be expected from the grandeur and importance of so might an object."

— Smith, Adam (1723-1790)


Place of Publication
London and Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed for A. Millar, in the Strand; and A. Kincaid and J. Bell, in Edinburgh
Date
1761
Metaphor
"The great judge of the world, has, for the wisest reasons, thought proper to interpose, between the weak eye of reason, and the throne of his eternal justice, a degree of obscurity and darkness, which though it does not intirely cover the great tribunal from the view of mankind, yet renders the impression of it faint and feeble in comparison of what might be expected from the grandeur and importance of so might an object."
Metaphor in Context
The great judge of the world, has, for the wisest reasons, thought proper to interpose, between the weak eye of reason, and the throne of his eternal justice, a degree of obscurity and darkness, which though it does not intirely cover the great tribunal from the view of mankind, yet renders the impression of it faint and feeble in comparison of what might be expected from the grandeur and importance of so might an object. If those infinite rewards and punishments which the Almighty has prepared for those who obey or transgress his will, were perceived as distinctly as we forsee the frivolous and temporary retaliations which we may expect from one another, the weakness of human nature, astonished at the immensity of objects so little fitted to its comprehension, could no longer attend to the little affairs of this world; and it is absolutely necessary that the business of society could have been carried on, if, in this respect, there had been a fuller revelation of the intentions of providence that that which has already been made. That men, however, might never be without a rule to direct their conduct by, not without a judge whose authority should enforce its observation, the author of nature has made man the immediate judge of mankind, and has, in this respect, as in many others, created him after his own image, and appointed him viceregent upon earth to superintend the behaviour of his brethren. They are taught by nature to acknowledge that power and jurisdiction which has thus been conferred upon him, and to tremble and exult according as they imagine that they have either merited his censure, or deserved his applause.
(pp. 203-4; cf. p. 128n in Liberty Fund ed.)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
9 entries in the ESTC (1761, 1764, 1767, 1774, 1777, 1781, 1790, 1792, 1793, 1797).

Text from The Theory of Moral Sentiments. By Adam Smith, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. 2nd ed. (London: Printed for A. Millar, in the Strand; and A. Kincaid and J. Bell, in Edinburgh, 1761). <Link to ESTC><Link to Google Books>

Reading Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984).
Theme
Mind's Eye
Date of Entry
06/19/2014

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.