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"But to return to our Monades, they are, says Leibnitz, mirrours of the universe, and so indeed are men too, though they reflect its parts very imperfectly. Men too are mirrours that are liable to be sullied in reflecting the objects by which they pass, and, like other mirrours, they are subject to be broken, in both which articles 'tis possible they are surpassed by Monades."

— Sterne, Laurence (1713-1768) [attrib.]

Author

Sterne, Laurence (1713-1768) [attrib.]

Work Title

Yorick's Meditations: Upon Various Interesting and Important Subjects

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for R. Stevens

Date

1760

Metaphor

"But to return to our Monades, they are, says Leibnitz, mirrours of the universe, and so indeed are men too, though they reflect its parts very imperfectly. Men too are mirrours that are liable to be sullied in reflecting the objects by which they pass, and, like other mirrours, they are subject to be broken, in both which articles 'tis possible they are surpassed by Monades."

Metaphor in Context

ONCE engaged in sublime and and elevated speculations, I cannot bring myself down to meditate upon sublunary things. A race of intelligent beings, called Monades, engage my attention--here somebody will probably be inquisitive to know what these Monades are--the great philosopher of Germany will inform you, Sir, they are beings which seem to hold a medium between body and spirit, consciousness of their unity, forms their essence, and by their knowledge of eternal truths, they are members of the everlasting city of God. They are called Monades from the Greek adjective μονας, which signifies alone, as every smatterer in Greek knows, as well as Leibnitz him. But what is this etymology founded upon?--why, Sir, 'tis founded upon this, every Monade has a right to say, I am myself alone. But here you'll ask me what right had Leibnitz to create such beings? what proof could he give of their existence? Lord! Lord! what a restraint you would lay upon philosophers. If you deny them the privilege of framing hypotheses, you reduce them to a level with other men. What proof could Descartes give in favour of his vortices and subtile matter? yet to these he owes his reputation as a philosopher. The fancy of a philosopher should be as unconfined as that of a poet or a painter. By scrupulously following phaenomina, he reduces himself to the rank of a mechanic. Commend me to Flud and Paracelsus, who have devised aerial beings enough to people a new creation. But to return to our Monades, they are, says Leibnitz, mirrours of the universe, and so indeed are men too, though they reflect its parts very imperfectly. Men too are mirrours that are liable to be sullied in reflecting the objects by which they pass, and, like other mirrours, they are subject to be broken, in both which articles 'tis possible they are surpassed by Monades. There is reason to think, that these beings have some intercourse with mankind, and 'tis not impossible, that our dreams may be suggested by them. 'Tis likely too that we owe to them those impulses, and that glimmering insight into futurity, which so many have experienced. Not to mention the daemon of Socrates, 'tis well known that Descartes in all his undertakings had some foreknowledge, whether the event would be favourable to him or not. I shall add but one instance more, and that is Ozanam the mathematician's prediction, concerning his own death, which was fulfilled a few days after, exactly in the manner he had foretold it. Here I doubt not but the critics will accuse me of credulity and superstition, but what care I? this is an atheistical age, and whoever believes any thing out of the common road is sure of being stigmatized as superstitious--nay, there are certain persons who call themselves moral philosophers, who look upon every man as superstitious who believes the Christian religion.
(pp. 87-91)