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"We first consider the nature of that act of the mind, which is termed belief; of which the immediate foundation is the testimony of our senses."

— Home, Henry, Lord Kames (1696-1782)

Author

Home, Henry, Lord Kames (1696-1782)

Work Title

Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion

Place of Publication

Edinburgh

Publisher

Printed by R. Fleming

Date

1751

Metaphor

"We first consider the nature of that act of the mind, which is termed belief; of which the immediate foundation is the testimony of our senses."

Metaphor in Context

[...] Hence the necessity of giving his mind a peculiar cast; in which, we cannot but discern the brightest characters of designing wisdom. By having his practical ideas, and his moral feelings, form'd upon an imaginary state of liberty, conscience exerts its power over him, with full authority; and scope is given, for a far richer and more diversified scene of action, than the perpetual consciousness of necessity could have admitted. Having shown, that morals are established on an immovable foundation, we proceed to show, by what inward powers we are led to the knowledge and belief of some of the most necessary truths; particularly that which it most imports us to know, the existence of the Deity. To this we pave the way, by a full preparation of reasoning. We first consider the nature of that act of the mind, which is termed belief; of which the immediate foundation is the testimony of our senses. If the testimony they give to the real existence of a material world, be a mere illusion, as some have held, all belief founded on our own feelings, is at an end. Hence there appears a necessity for establishing the authority of our senses. And here we find full satisfaction. For, in other cases, where there is any thing like artifice in the conduct of nature, means are afforded, both of discovering the truth, and of discovering the end, for which artifice is made use of, to conceal the truth. She never deceives us in vain. But, in the case of external existences, we find nothing, after the strictest scrutiny, but presumptions, hypotheses and fallacious reasonings, opposed to the clearest testimony, which nature can give. Dispersing with no great labour, that philosophic dust, which sceptics have raised about material substance, we find it no more difficult to be conceived, than qualities; both being equally displayed to us, by a peculiar modification of the sense of sight. But belief is not more solidly founded upon our external senses, than upon our internal feelings. Not the greatest sceptic ever doubted of his own personal identity, continued thro' the successive periods of life; of his being the same man this year, he was the last: which, however, is a discovery made by no reasoning; resting wholly upon a simple feeling, or inward sense and consciousness of the fact. [...]
(pp. 382-384)