"We are chained to a Body, that is to say, our Perceptions are connected with corporeal Motions."
— Berkeley, George (1685-1753)
Author
Work Title
Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed by G. James, for Henry Clements
Date
1713, 1734
Metaphor
"We are chained to a Body, that is to say, our Perceptions are connected with corporeal Motions."
Metaphor in Context
Phil.
That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what Pain is, even every sort of painful Sensation, and what it is for His Creatures to suffer Pain, I make no question. But that God, tho' He knows, and sometimes causes painful Sensations in us, can Himself suffer Pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent Spirits, are liable to Impressions of Sense, the Effects of an external Agent, which, being produced against our Wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external Being can affect, who perceives nothing by Sense as we do, whose Will is absolute, and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted, or resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a Being as this, can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful Sensation, or, indeed, any Sensation at all. We are chained to a Body, that is to say, our Perceptions are connected with corporeal Motions. By the Law of our Nature, we are affected upon every Alteration in the nervous Parts of our sensible Body: Which sensible Body, rightly considered, is nothing but a Complexion of such Qualities, or Ideas, as have no Existence distinct from being perceived by a Mind: So that this Connexion of Sensations with corporeal Motions, means no more, than a Correspondence in the Order of Nature, between two Setts of Ideas, or Things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure Spirit, disengaged from all such Sympathy, or natural Ties. No corporeal Motions are attended with the Sensations of Pain, or Pleasure, in his Mind. To know every thing knowable, is certainly a Perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel any thing by Sense, is an Imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath Ideas; but His Ideas are not convey'd to Him by Sense, as ours are. Your not Distinguishing, where there is so manifest a Difference, makes you fancy, you see an Absurdity where there is none.
(pp. 124-5)
That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what Pain is, even every sort of painful Sensation, and what it is for His Creatures to suffer Pain, I make no question. But that God, tho' He knows, and sometimes causes painful Sensations in us, can Himself suffer Pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent Spirits, are liable to Impressions of Sense, the Effects of an external Agent, which, being produced against our Wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external Being can affect, who perceives nothing by Sense as we do, whose Will is absolute, and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted, or resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a Being as this, can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful Sensation, or, indeed, any Sensation at all. We are chained to a Body, that is to say, our Perceptions are connected with corporeal Motions. By the Law of our Nature, we are affected upon every Alteration in the nervous Parts of our sensible Body: Which sensible Body, rightly considered, is nothing but a Complexion of such Qualities, or Ideas, as have no Existence distinct from being perceived by a Mind: So that this Connexion of Sensations with corporeal Motions, means no more, than a Correspondence in the Order of Nature, between two Setts of Ideas, or Things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure Spirit, disengaged from all such Sympathy, or natural Ties. No corporeal Motions are attended with the Sensations of Pain, or Pleasure, in his Mind. To know every thing knowable, is certainly a Perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel any thing by Sense, is an Imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath Ideas; but His Ideas are not convey'd to Him by Sense, as ours are. Your not Distinguishing, where there is so manifest a Difference, makes you fancy, you see an Absurdity where there is none.
(pp. 124-5)
Categories
Provenance
Reading
Citation
5 entries in ESTC (1713, 1725, 1734, 1776, 1777).
See Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous: The Design of Which Is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and Perfection of Human Knowledge, the Incorporeal Nature of the Soul, and the Immediate Providence of a Deity: In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy, Useful, and Compendious. (London: Printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in S. Paul’s Church-Yard, 1713). <Link to ESTC><Link to ECCO-TCP>
Working with the Past Masters electronic version of The Works of George Berkeley, ed. T. E. Jessop and A. A. Luce, vol. II (Desirée Park: Thomas Nelson, 1979).
See Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous: The Design of Which Is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and Perfection of Human Knowledge, the Incorporeal Nature of the Soul, and the Immediate Providence of a Deity: In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy, Useful, and Compendious. (London: Printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in S. Paul’s Church-Yard, 1713). <Link to ESTC><Link to ECCO-TCP>
Working with the Past Masters electronic version of The Works of George Berkeley, ed. T. E. Jessop and A. A. Luce, vol. II (Desirée Park: Thomas Nelson, 1979).
Date of Entry
09/12/2013
