"At present, we are supposing Reason to be entire, so far as it goes, without considering the narrowness of its Limits, nor the Clogs that are upon it, nor whether these Clogs are most owing to the Appetites or the Passions. All such Discussions are endless."
— Forbes of Pitsligo, Alexander Forbes, Lord (1678-1762)
Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed for J. Osborn and T. Longman
Date
1734
Metaphor
"At present, we are supposing Reason to be entire, so far as it goes, without considering the narrowness of its Limits, nor the Clogs that are upon it, nor whether these Clogs are most owing to the Appetites or the Passions. All such Discussions are endless."
Metaphor in Context
LUCINUS
But the Understanding, or Reason, however often mis-led, may still (in some respect) be called the leading Faculty, and supposed to be free of any byass; all Light, without any Heat. Pure Deliberation, assenting, denying, chusing, rejecting, &c. imply the operation of the Head only, as if the Heart had no interest in the thing: for certainly we judge thus coolly on some occasions. And as Liberty was considered but as a power to make use of our Faculties in general, so the last step of Reason is to make its choice, which it does (in sound unbyass'd Minds) according to the nature of Things; or, in other words, according to the Truth.
At present, we are supposing Reason to be entire, so far as it goes, without considering the narrowness of its Limits, nor the Clogs that are upon it, nor whether these Clogs are most owing to the Appetites or the Passions. All such Discussions are endless.
Taking Reason therefore only for the natural Light of the Mind, we may well enough conclude, that natural Truths, or Principles, belong to it, as visible Objects belong to the Eye. Knowledge is but the seeing things as they are, or in the way they are design'd to appear to us: for, strictly speaking, we see few things as they really are, no more than we see the Sun in the Firmament as he is.
(p. 73)
But the Understanding, or Reason, however often mis-led, may still (in some respect) be called the leading Faculty, and supposed to be free of any byass; all Light, without any Heat. Pure Deliberation, assenting, denying, chusing, rejecting, &c. imply the operation of the Head only, as if the Heart had no interest in the thing: for certainly we judge thus coolly on some occasions. And as Liberty was considered but as a power to make use of our Faculties in general, so the last step of Reason is to make its choice, which it does (in sound unbyass'd Minds) according to the nature of Things; or, in other words, according to the Truth.
At present, we are supposing Reason to be entire, so far as it goes, without considering the narrowness of its Limits, nor the Clogs that are upon it, nor whether these Clogs are most owing to the Appetites or the Passions. All such Discussions are endless.
Taking Reason therefore only for the natural Light of the Mind, we may well enough conclude, that natural Truths, or Principles, belong to it, as visible Objects belong to the Eye. Knowledge is but the seeing things as they are, or in the way they are design'd to appear to us: for, strictly speaking, we see few things as they really are, no more than we see the Sun in the Firmament as he is.
(p. 73)
Categories
Provenance
ECCO-TCP
Citation
Three entries in ESTC (1734, 1762, 1763).
See Essays Moral and Philosophical, on Several Subjects: Viz. A View of the Human Faculties. (London: Printed for J. Osborn and T. Longman, 1734). <Link to ECCO-TCP>
See Essays Moral and Philosophical, on Several Subjects: Viz. A View of the Human Faculties. (London: Printed for J. Osborn and T. Longman, 1734). <Link to ECCO-TCP>
Date of Entry
08/18/2013
