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"The order of things is thereby reversed; reason is dethroned, and sense usurps the place of judgment."

— Duff, William (1732-1815)

Author

An Essay on Original Genius

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for Edward and Charles Dilly

Date

1767

Metaphor

"The order of things is thereby reversed; reason is dethroned, and sense usurps the place of judgment."

Metaphor in Context

"We may define TASTE to be that internal sense, which, by its own exquisitely nice sensibility, without the assistance of the reasoning faculty, distinguishes and determines the various qualities of the objects submitted to its cognisance; pronouncing, by its own arbitrary verdict, that they are grand or mean, beautiful or ugly, decent or ridiculous." From this definition it appears, that Taste is designed as a supplement to the defects of the power of judgment, at least in canvassing the merit of the performances of art. These indeed are the subjects on which it exercises its discerning talent with the greatest propriety, as well as with the greatest probability of success: its dominion, however, is in some degree universal, both in the Arts and Sciences; though that dominion is much more absolute, and more legitimate in the former than it is in the latter. The truth is, to bring philosophical subjects to the tribunal of Taste, or to employ this faculty principally in their examination, is extremely dangerous, and naturally productive of absurdity and error. The order of things is thereby reversed; reason is dethroned, and sense usurps the place of judgment. Taste therefore must be contented to act an inferior and subordinate part in the researches of science: it must not pretend to take the lead of reason, but humbly follow the path marked out by it. In the designs and works of art, the case is quite otherwise. Instead of being directed by judgment, it claims the direction in its turn; its authority is uncontrolable, and there lies no appeal from its decisions. Indeed it is well qualified to decide with precision and certainty on subject of this kind; for it possesses a perspicacity of discernment with regard to them which reason can by no means pretend to, even on those subjects that are the most adapted to its nature. So much more perfect are the senses than the understanding.
(pp. 11-2)