"That turn of imagination which fits a person for productions in the arts, may no doubt be most properly said to soar, to fly, and to have wings. To dig with labour and patience, is a metaphor which may with equal propriety be applied to the investigation of philosophical truth; it is strongly expressive of the intense and continued exertion of judgment, which is requisite in observing all the circumstances of the several experiments, discerning which of them are essential, comparing them together, and tracing out the result of the whole: but the metaphor must not be overstrained, it must not be understood so strictly as to represent the philosopher as a mere drudge, destitute of fancy; without great vigour and activity of imagination, the experiments and observations made use of in that curious work, or in any philosophical enquiry of a like nature, could not be contrived, suggested, and arranged, so as to lay a foundation for legitimate conclusions."
— Gerard, Alexander (1728-1795)
Metaphor
"That turn of imagination which fits a person for productions in the arts, may no doubt be most properly said to soar, to fly, and to have wings. To dig with labour and patience, is a metaphor which may with equal propriety be applied to the investigation of philosophical truth; it is strongly expressive of the intense and continued exertion of judgment, which is requisite in observing all the circumstances of the several experiments, discerning which of them are essential, comparing them together, and tracing out the result of the whole: but the metaphor must not be overstrained, it must not be understood so strictly as to represent the philosopher as a mere drudge, destitute of fancy; without great vigour and activity of imagination, the experiments and observations made use of in that curious work, or in any philosophical enquiry of a like nature, could not be contrived, suggested, and arranged, so as to lay a foundation for legitimate conclusions."
Metaphor in Context
Scientific genius has been described with a like inaccuracy; it has been considered as requiring only judgment, and not at all implying imagination. We have seen that it holds much more of judgment, than genius for the arts does: this has given occasion for ascribing it wholly to that faculty; but it is a mistake. A very ingenious and profound philosopher has given his sanction to this mistake; speaking of a work which indicates a very great degree of scientific genius, not only uncommon clearness and depth of judgment, but also strength and even liveliness of imagination, he disclaims genius, and intimates that the nature of his work required it not; "I claim no other merit, than that of having given great attention to the operations of my own mind, and of having expressed, with all the perspicuity I was able, what, I conceive, every man who gives the same attention, will feel and perceive. The productions of imagination require a genius which soars above the common rank; but the treasures of knowlege are commonly buried deep, and may be reached by those drudges who can dig with labour and patience, though they have not wings to fly." The author's modesty under-rates his own abilities, and in this instance renders his decision inaccurate. That turn of imagination which fits a person for productions in the arts, may no doubt be most properly said to soar, to fly, and to have wings. To dig with labour and patience, is a metaphor which may with equal propriety be applied to the investigation of philosophical truth; it is strongly expressive of the intense and continued exertion of judgment, which is requisite in observing all the circumstances of the several experiments, discerning which of them are essential, comparing them together, and tracing out the result of the whole: but the metaphor must not be overstrained, it must not be understood so strictly as to represent the philosopher as a mere drudge, destitute of fancy; without great vigour and activity of imagination, the experiments and observations made use of in that curious work, or in any philosophical enquiry of a like nature, could not be contrived, suggested, and arranged, so as to lay a foundation for legitimate conclusions. The Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense, shows not merely great acuteness of judgment, but also a very high degree of that penetration in which force of imagination is an indispensable ingredient. After the author has unfolded his important discoveries, another man may feel and perceive the several operations which he describes, by giving even less attention than he bestowed, and without possessing any share of genius; but genius was absolutely necessary to the making of the discoveries. The work is not, in the ordinary sense, a production of imagination; but it displays imagination and genius, though of a different kind from what is displayed in a picture or a poem, yet soaring as much above the common rank. In science, the operation of judgment is more obvious and striking than in the arts; it is it, not imagination, that finishes the work; and therefore even that part of the work, which imagination alone can accomplish, and which indicates genius, has been ascribed to judgment.
(III.v, pp. 381-4)