"Another consequence is, that the memories of different persons are suited to different subjects. Some are especially ready in remembering reasonings, and such phenomena and processes in nature as are the proper subjects of reasoning; the connexions of things as causes and effects, make the strongest impression on their memory."

— Gerard, Alexander (1728-1795)


Work Title
Place of Publication
London and Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed for W. Strahan, T.Cadell, and W. Creech
Date
1774
Metaphor
"Another consequence is, that the memories of different persons are suited to different subjects. Some are especially ready in remembering reasonings, and such phenomena and processes in nature as are the proper subjects of reasoning; the connexions of things as causes and effects, make the strongest impression on their memory."
Metaphor in Context
All the observed connexions of things lay hold of the memory in some degree; but they do not all equally lay hold of the memory of every man. One person's memory retains some connexions most strongly; another person's retains chiefly quite different connexions. One consequence of this is, that if two persons give an account of any object which they remember, their descriptions of it will be considerably different. Were they to introduce representations of that object into works of genius, there would be a correspondent dissimilitude between these representations. There would be a difference likewise in the uses to which they were applied; for by being put into different attitudes, the same object is adapted to different purposes. Another consequence is, that the memories of different persons are suited to different subjects. Some are especially ready in remembering reasonings, and such phenomena and processes in nature as are the proper subjects of reasoning; the connexions of things as causes and effects, make the strongest impression on their memory. Some retain most firmly the form and structure of natural bodies, or descriptions of them; their memory is chiefly affected by the co-existence of the parts. Others retain best, trains of events, or relations of them in history; vicinity, order, and that species of causation by which events depend on one another, are the connexions which suit their memory. Others are remarkable for easily remembering poetry; the relations of ideas which prevail in it, lay fastest hold on their memory: many of these relations are originally bestowed upon the parts solely by imagination; but after they are bestowed, and the work is read, they become observed connexions of the parts of that work, and are proper objects of memory. Those things which are peculiarly suitable to a person's memory, are generally those to which his understanding and his taste are most adapted. This suggests a reason why they are peculiarly suitable to his memory: they are the subjects to which he can attend most easily and most closely, into which he can enter most deeply, and from which he receives the greatest pleasure; they cannot therefore fail to make a strong and lasting impression on him. Their making such an impression on him, will necessarily have an influence on the turn of his genius. Every man will introduce into his works chiefly those subjects which he remembers best, if they can at all suit his purpose. Both the illustrations and the episodes of one poet, relate almost constantly to natural things; those of another are generally taken from history, or consist of narration; a third abounds on every occasion with moral sentiments, or runs out into philosophical speculations. The peculiar congruity of different connexions to different memories, contributes to produce variety of genius, in the same manner, though not in so great a degree, as the predominance of one associating principle; for exertions of memory enter into every work of genius, though only in subordination to the exertions of imagination.
(II.ix, pp. 276-8)
Categories
Provenance
Reading in C-H Lion
Citation
Only 1 entry in ESTC (1774).

An Essay on Genius. By Alexander Gerard, D.D. Professor of Divinity in King's College, Aberdeen. (London: Printed for W. Strahan; T. Cadell, and W. Creech at Edinburgh 1774). <Link to ECCO>
Date of Entry
06/27/2013

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.