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"Because the impression is made quickly, it does not follow that it is strong: a susceptible memory, like a soft body, receives some impression at once, and because this impression is perceivable at once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we allow it to continue slight: when the memory is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the impression is not made without continued labour, it is deep before it can be at all taken notice of, and therefore it is permanent."

— Gerard, Alexander (1728-1795)

Author

An Essay on Genius

Place of Publication

London and Edinburgh

Publisher

Printed for W. Strahan, T.Cadell, and W. Creech

Date

1774

Metaphor

"Because the impression is made quickly, it does not follow that it is strong: a susceptible memory, like a soft body, receives some impression at once, and because this impression is perceivable at once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we allow it to continue slight: when the memory is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the impression is not made without continued labour, it is deep before it can be at all taken notice of, and therefore it is permanent."

Metaphor in Context

There are chiefly four perfections of which memory is capable. These are rarely united in the same person; and the prevalence of one of them, or the manner and degree in which they are united, produces very great diversities in the memories of different persons. Some of the perfections of memory arise from the strength with which separate perceptions are remembered, others from the ability of remembering their connexions firmly.--It is a perfection of memory to be susceptible, to receive an impression quickly: it is likewise a perfection of memory to be tenacious. Both these perfections arise chiefly from a fitness for remembering separate perceptions: but they do not always go together; nay, they who commit a thing quickly to memory, generally forget it soonest. This may seem to contradict the maxim, that perceptions originally strong, are firmly remembered. But it is perfectly consistent with it. Because the impression is made quickly, it does not follow that it is strong: a susceptible memory, like a soft body, receives some impression at once, and because this impression is perceivable at once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we allow it to continue slight: when the memory is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the impression is not made without continued labour, it is deep before it can be at all taken notice of, and therefore it is permanent. Sometimes these perfections are united: the memory is of such a happy temperature as may be compared to wax, which receives the seal easily and strongly when it is melted, and immediately hardens and suffers it not to be effaced. Of these two perfections, the former is in its nature and principles most congenial to genius; but the latter is at least equally subservient to its operations; for no perception can be suggested by fancy or applied to any purpose, except it be remembered.--It is a perfection of memory to be distinct, to exhibit things in their proper form and order: it is also a perfection to be ready, to call to mind easily and quickly such ideas as we have occasion for. Distinctness relates to such things as are in our view together; readiness, to such as make their appearance in succession. They are inseparable, and always take place almost in the same degree. They arise from the same principle, from a natural aptitude to retain the relations of things. The memory cannot indeed be distinct, except the several separate perceptions be well retained; the omission of one part or member would destroy the harmony of the whole: but distinctness arises immediately from a lively remembrance of their connexions; if this were wanting, all the particulars would lie jumbled in confusion. It is, in like manner, when the connexions of things are strongly perceived, that some of them introduce others readily. If in some cases there be distinctness of remembrance without readiness of recollection, the defect in this latter virtue is owing to the weakness and inactivity of imagination, failing to exert itself at the proper time. In proportion to the degree in which these perfections of memory are possessed, they must render the energies of genius the more perfect, and likewise affect the form of its productions, so far as it employs in them materials borrowed from memory. Confusion in a work may proceed from indistinctness of remembrance, as well as from irregularity of imagination: not only feebleness of imagination, but also slowness of recollection, may render a work both laborious and meagre. Besides these defects, confusion and slowness, which are directly opposed to the excellences of memory now under consideration, there is an imperfection which bears a relation to both these excellences, which seems to resemble them, but in truth only mimics them; I mean, the remembrance of things merely by rote, when a person can run over things exactly, in their observed order, and be certain of recollecting any part of them by thus running over them, but can remember nothing, if he be put out of that train. In this case, the separate perceptions are faintly impressed upon the mind, their experienced connexions strongly; and these are the only connexions which influence it, the relations conferred by imagination have none; the subject likewise is not clearly understood. These being the causes of this peculiarity of memory, it can seldom be found along with genius, or indeed with a great degree of any of the intellectual powers.
(II.ix, pp. 269-272)