"For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul."

— Sergeant, John (1622-1707)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed for A. Roper
Date
1698
Metaphor
"For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul."
Metaphor in Context
43 First then, 'tis so certainly known, that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia, or, (as they say,) run on four Feet, that it is grown Proverbial; which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common. 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things, to Immaterial, are particularly liable to this Defect. They may, indeed, oft times, serve to illustrate some Truth, as fit Metaphors to sute with our Fancy; but then they presuppose the Truth, which they are to illustrate, to be known some other Way. Whence, unless this be done first, all they can do is to explicate we know not what, which destroys the nature of an Explication; for, Explications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point, but suppose it. 3. All the Actions of our Soul are, or ought to be Rational; and have a Dependence on one another, by the way of Reason gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded. Now, I think, 'tis impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius's Meditations, but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his, are reducible to this Enthymem; [For these and these Reasons, there can no Certainty be had, as to Speculative Knowledges, by any Information had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses; therefore, it ought to be sought for in some Interiour Act of our Mind, which is most Comprehensive and Peculiar to it,] which he concieved was Cogitation; and thence he laid this First Principle: [Cogito ergo sum] Which being so, it follows necessarily, that the Laying this for his First Principle, depended on the Goodness of the Reasons he had, why our Senses were not to be trusted, nor could give us our First Notions; whence, by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity, we might have those Self-evident, and First Truths, of ours. This, I say, was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information, conclude; but that, notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have follow'd: Nor, could he have had any Ground for recurring to the Interiour Act of Cogitation, for his First Principle, in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses, as was now declar'd. 4. It being then evident, that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summ'd up in the Enthymem now mention'd, 'tis manifest, that this Explication of yours falters in the main Particular, in which it ought to sute, and resemble. For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul. So that your Similitude is, in effect, the Begging the whole Question; and can have no Force at all, but by our Granting it; which, I see plainly, we shall never have Reason to do. Rather, unless this Petitio Principii (which is tacitly involv'd in this Parallel) be yielded by us, or prov'd by you, it makes against your selves. For, by Denying all such certain Information from the Senses, you will be found, not to remove the Rubbish, in order to lay the Foundation; but, to stop up the Way to the laying any; and, to damm up all the Holes, by which the Materials could come into our Minds, where only such a Foundation could have been laid. At least, you see, your Explication amounts to nothing; and, that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs, and has not one Sure Foot to stand on. Which will, I hope, sufficiently inform others, that this Way of Explicating, so mightily affected by Cartesius, and his Followers, is utterly Insignificant. I shall hope too, that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers, who are so Intelligent, as to discern, that this Explicative Way is taken up, to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof; which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles.
(pp. 94-8)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
John Sergeant, Non Ultra, or, A Letter to a Learned Cartesian Settling the Rule of Truth, and First Principles, Upon their Deepest Ground (London: Printed for A. Roper, 1698). <Link to EEBO-TCP>
Date of Entry
04/02/2013

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.