« back to search

"This Proposition, then, say we, is such, that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule."

— Sergeant, John (1622-1707)

Author

Sergeant, John (1622-1707)

Work Title

Non Ultra, or, A Letter to a Learned Cartesian Settling the Rule of Truth, and First Principles, Upon their Deepest Ground

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for A. Roper

Date

1698

Metaphor

"This Proposition, then, say we, is such, that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule."

Metaphor in Context

28. Again; This Object, which you Clearly and Distinctly see to be True, must be some Mental Proposition; for, nothing can be Formally True, but some Speech that Affirms, or Denies. Now, say we, 'tis most incontestable, that the First Proposition we can make of a Thing, is, to affirm its Metaphysical Verity; or, to say, 'Tis this, (or its self,) and no other: For, the Subject being the Basis of all our Thoughts, we must fix it certainly, Clearly and Distinctly, ere we can, with Certainty, say any thing else of it. This Proposition, then, say we, is such, that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule. It remains then, that you shew us some Truth, or Proposition, which is before this, (which we think to be the First,) and which both makes it self thus Visible; and also, by its Selfevident Light, gives Clearness and Intelligibility to all other Truths; and, lastly, which is so Firmly Grounded, that it may be a Solid First Principle, and not an Aery and Phantastick Conceit. You must then, (we say,) produce, and shew us some other Proposition than that you have brought hitherto, which tells us your Clear and Distinct Perception is your Rule; for, this, you see, is already, by many Unanswerable Arguments, thrown out of doors, and shewn Unfit to be a Rule. And, till you do this, you ought not to be offended, if we tell you friendly, and plainly, that you have no Rule of Truth at all.
(pp. 57-8)