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"[F]or though, when we are solicitously engaged in any action, deeply involved in any thought, or strongly hurried away by any passion, we may often be unconscious of the impressions made by material causes on the organs of sense; yet we cannot but be sensible of the ideas formed within us by the internal operation of our minds, because their very existence depends upon our being conscious of them, and is at an end, as soon as either we attend not to, or forget them."

— Whytt, Robert (1714-1766)

Author

Whytt, Robert (1714-1766)

Work Title

An Essay on the Vital and Other Involuntary Motions of Animals

Place of Publication

Edinburgh

Publisher

Printed by Hamilton, Balfour, and Neill

Date

1751

Metaphor

"[F]or though, when we are solicitously engaged in any action, deeply involved in any thought, or strongly hurried away by any passion, we may often be unconscious of the impressions made by material causes on the organs of sense; yet we cannot but be sensible of the ideas formed within us by the internal operation of our minds, because their very existence depends upon our being conscious of them, and is at an end, as soon as either we attend not to, or forget them."

Metaphor in Context

Further, if there were any exercise of reason necessary to the continuance of the vital motions, the mind certainly ought to be conscious of this; since, in every ratiocination respecting action, there must first be a comparison of things, and then, in consequence os this comparison, a preference or election: but, I believe, few Philosophers will be found hardy enough to maintain, that the mind can compare two, or more ideas, and thence form certain conclusions and determinations, without being so much as conscious, in any degree, of what it has been all the while employed about: for though, when we are solicitously engaged in any action, deeply involved in any thought, or strongly hurried away by any passion, we may often be unconscious of the impressions made by material causes on the organs of sense; yet we cannot but be sensible of the ideas formed within us by the internal operation of our minds, because their very existence depends upon our being conscious of them, and is at an end, as soon as either we attend not to, or forget them: to say therefore that such ideas may be formed and exist in the mind without consciousness, is, in effect, to say that they may, and may not exist at the same time; than which nothing can be more absurd.
(Sect XI, pp. 286-7)