"Nay, Epicurus himself, according to Lucretius, did not look upon these two as separate beings, but regarded the mind as a kind of mouvement produced by the anima or soul."
— Whytt, Robert (1714-1766)
Author
Place of Publication
Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed by Hamilton, Balfour, and Neill
Date
1751
Metaphor
"Nay, Epicurus himself, according to Lucretius, did not look upon these two as separate beings, but regarded the mind as a kind of mouvement produced by the anima or soul."
Metaphor in Context
As I cannot therefore agree with those, who, in ascribing all our powers to mere matter, seem willing to deprive us wholly of mind; so neither, at the same time, do I see any reason for multiplying principles of this kind in man: and, therefore, I am inclined to think the anima and animus, as they have been termed,, or the sentient and rational soul, to be only one and the same principle acting in different capacities. Nay, Epicurus himself, according to Lucretius, did not look upon these two as separate beings, but regarded the mind as a kind of mouvement produced by the anima or soul.
(Sect XI, pp. 281-2)
(Sect XI, pp. 281-2)
Categories
Provenance
Searching in Google Books
Citation
3 entries in ESTC (1751, 1763, 1768).
Robert Whytt, An Essay on the Vital and Other Involuntary Motions of Animals (Edinburgh: Printed by Hamilton, Balfour, and Neill, 1751). <Link to Google Books>
Robert Whytt, An Essay on the Vital and Other Involuntary Motions of Animals (Edinburgh: Printed by Hamilton, Balfour, and Neill, 1751). <Link to Google Books>
Date of Entry
04/25/2012
