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"So if the Knowledge of Corporeal Things were but a Secondary and Derivative Result from Sense, (though it cannot be conceived that the Passion of Sense should ray upon the Intellect, so as to beget a Secondary Passion there, any more than one Shadow should cast another) then Knowledge would be much a Weaker Perception of them than Sense it self is, and nothing but as it were the Secondary Reflection of an Image, or the Remote Cyclings and Undulations of the fluid Water, or the meer Echo of the Echo of an Original Voice: Or, Lastly, nothing but the Shadow of the Shadow of a Substance."

— Cudworth, Ralph (1617-1688)

Author

Cudworth, Ralph (1617-1688)

Work Title

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for James and John Knapton

Date

1731

Metaphor

"So if the Knowledge of Corporeal Things were but a Secondary and Derivative Result from Sense, (though it cannot be conceived that the Passion of Sense should ray upon the Intellect, so as to beget a Secondary Passion there, any more than one Shadow should cast another) then Knowledge would be much a Weaker Perception of them than Sense it self is, and nothing but as it were the Secondary Reflection of an Image, or the Remote Cyclings and Undulations of the fluid Water, or the meer Echo of the Echo of an Original Voice: Or, Lastly, nothing but the Shadow of the Shadow of a Substance."

Metaphor in Context

Now if Sense it self be not Knowledge, much less can any Secondary or Derivative Result from Sense be Knowledge; for this would be a more Obscure, Shadowy and Evanid Thing than Sense it self is. As when the Image of a Man's Face, received in a Mirror or Looking-glass, is reflected from thence into a Second Mirror, and so forward into a Third; still the further it goes, the more Obscure, Confused and imperfect it grows, till at last it becomes altogether imperceptible. Or as in the Circlings and Undulations of Water, caused by the falling of a Stone into it, that are successively propagated from one to another; the further and wider they go, the Waves are still the less, slower and weaker, till at length they become quite undiscernable. Or as a Secondary Echo, that is, the Echo of an Echo, falls as much short of the Primary Echo in Proportion, as that doth of the Original Voice. Or, Lastly, If we could suppose a Shadow to cast a Shadow, this Secondary Shadow, or Projection of a Shadow, would fall as much short of the Primary Shadow, as that did of the Substance it self. So if the Knowledge of Corporeal Things were but a Secondary and Derivative Result from Sense, (though it cannot be conceived that the Passion of Sense should ray upon the Intellect, so as to beget a Secondary Passion there, any more than one Shadow should cast another) then Knowledge would be much a Weaker Perception of them than Sense it self is, and nothing but as it were the Secondary Reflection of an Image, or the Remote Cyclings and Undulations of the fluid Water, or the meer Echo of the Echo of an Original Voice: Or, Lastly, nothing but the Shadow of the Shadow of a Substance. Whereas it is a far more real, substantial and satisfactory, more penetrative and comprehensive Perception than Sense is, reaching to the Very Inward Essence of the Things perceived. And therefore it must of Necessity proceed from the Active Power of the Mind it self, exerting its own Intelligible Ideas upon that which is Passively perceived, and so comprehending it by something of its own that is Native and Domestick to it. So that besides the Sensations or Phantasms, the Sensible Ideas of Corporeal Things passively impressed upon us from without, there must be also Conceptions, or Intelligible Ideas of them Actively Exerted from the Mind it self; or otherwise they could never be Understood.
(IV.iii.2, pp. 190-2)