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"Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it."

— Cudworth, Ralph (1617-1688)

Author

Cudworth, Ralph (1617-1688)

Work Title

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for James and John Knapton

Date

1731

Metaphor

"Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it."

Metaphor in Context

3. For though the Soul be a distinct Substance, and of a different Nature from the Body, yet notwithstanding in every Animal it is intimately conjoyned with the Body, and Cleaves to it in such a Manner, as that both together Compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a Mariner with a Ship, that is, meerly Locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct Things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the Body is hurt, the Soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a Mariner knows that a Ship hath sprung a Leak, or when a Man is informed that his Neighbour's House is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement Pain, and hath a dolorous Sense or Perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, the Soul doth not unpassionately know this as an Indifferent By-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire Meat and Drink for it, but it feels a passionate Sense of Hunger and Thirst in it self, as being Intimately concerned in the Business. Now the same is true also in those other Sensations, in which the Animal seems to be less concerned, as of Light and Colour, Heat and Cold, Sounds and Odours, that they are not simple Knowledges or Intellections of that part of the Soul which acts alone by it self, but they are the Perceptions of that which is vitally united with the Body, and sympathizing with the Motions and Passions of it, makes up one Compound with it. Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it. And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, 'as it is absurd to say the Soul Weaves,' (or indeed the Body either, Weaving being a mixt Action of the Man and Weaving Instruments) so it is absurd to say that the Soul alone doth Covet, Grieve or Perceive: these things proceeding from the Compound or the Coalescence of Soul and Body together; being not pure Mental, but Corporeal Cogitations of the Soul, as it vitally informs the Body, and is Passionately united to it.
(III.ii.3, pp. 88-90)