"When Reason invades the rights of Common Sense, and presumes to arraign that authority by which she herself acts, nonsense and confusion must of necessity ensue; science will soon come to have neither head nor tail, beginning nor end; philosophy will grow contemptible; and its adherents, far from being treated, as in former times, upon the footing of conjurers, will be thought by the vulgar, and by every man of sense, to be little better than downright fools."
— Beattie, James (1735-1803)
Author
Work Title
Place of Publication
Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed for A. Kincaid & J. Bell. Sold, at London, by E. & C. Dilly
Date
1770
Metaphor
"When Reason invades the rights of Common Sense, and presumes to arraign that authority by which she herself acts, nonsense and confusion must of necessity ensue; science will soon come to have neither head nor tail, beginning nor end; philosophy will grow contemptible; and its adherents, far from being treated, as in former times, upon the footing of conjurers, will be thought by the vulgar, and by every man of sense, to be little better than downright fools."
Metaphor in Context
In the laws of nature, when thoroughly understood, there appear no contradictions. It is only in the systems of philosophers that reason and common sense are at variance. No man of common sense ever did or could believe, that the horse he saw coming toward him at full gallop, was an idea in his mind, and nothing else; no thief was ever such a fool, as to plead in his own defence, that his crime was necessary and unavoidable, for that man is born to pick pockets as the sparks fly upward. When Reason invades the rights of Common Sense, and presumes to arraign that authority by which she herself acts, nonsense and confusion must of necessity ensue; science will soon come to have neither head nor tail, beginning nor end; philosophy will grow contemptible; and its adherents, far from being treated, as in former times, upon the footing of conjurers, will be thought by the vulgar, and by every man of sense, to be little better than downright fools.
(I.ii.9, p. 161)
(I.ii.9, p. 161)
Categories
Provenance
Searching in Google Books
Citation
10 entries in ESTC (1770, 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, 1777, 1778).
Beattie, James. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: A Kincaid & J. Bell, 1770). <Link to ECCO>
Text from corrected and enlarged second edition of 1771. <Link to Google Books>
Beattie, James. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: A Kincaid & J. Bell, 1770). <Link to ECCO>
Text from corrected and enlarged second edition of 1771. <Link to Google Books>
Date of Entry
09/29/2011
