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"What is it to which a wise man will pay more attention, than to his reason and conscience, those divine monitors by which he is to judge even of religion itself, and which he is not at liberty to disobey, though an angel from heaven should command him?"

— Beattie, James (1735-1803)

Author

Beattie, James (1735-1803)

Work Title

An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism

Place of Publication

Edinburgh

Publisher

Printed for A. Kincaid & J. Bell. Sold, at London, by E. & C. Dilly

Date

1770

Metaphor

"What is it to which a wise man will pay more attention, than to his reason and conscience, those divine monitors by which he is to judge even of religion itself, and which he is not at liberty to disobey, though an angel from heaven should command him?"

Metaphor in Context

Let it not be thought, that these objects and faculties of internal sensation are matters too evanescent to be attended to, or that their evidence is too weak to produce a steady and well-grounded conviction. They are more necessary to our happiness than even the powers and objects of external sense; yea, they are no less necessary to our existence. What can be of greater consequence to man, than his moral sentiments, his reason, his memory, his imagination? What more interesting, than to know, whether his notions of duty and of truth be the dictates of his nature, that is, the voice of God, or the positive institutions of men? What is it to which a wise man will pay more attention, than to his reason and conscience, those divine monitors by which he is to judge even of religion itself, and which he is not at liberty to disobey, though an angel from heaven should command him? The generality of mankind, however ignorant of the received distinctions and explications of their internal powers, do yet by their conduct declare, that they feel their authority, and acknowledge their authenticity. Every instance of their being governed by a principle of moral obligation, is a proof of this. They believe, an action to be lawful in the sight of God; when they are conscious of a sentiment of lawfulness attending the performance of it: they believe a certain mode of conduct to be incumbent on them in certain circumstances, because a sentiment of duty arises in their mind, when they contemplate that conduct in relation to those circumstances.--"I ought to be grateful for a favour received. Why? Because my conscience tells me so. How do you know that you ought to do that of which your conscience enjoins the performance? I can give no further reason for it; but I feel that such is my duty." [...]
(I.ii.3, pp. 71-3)