"But this faculty [Reason] has been much perverted, often to vile, and often to insignificant purposes; sometimes chained like a slave or malefactor, and sometimes soaring in forbidden and unknown regions."
— Beattie, James (1735-1803)
Author
Work Title
Place of Publication
Edinburgh
Publisher
Printed for A. Kincaid & J. Bell. Sold, at London, by E. & C. Dilly
Date
1770
Metaphor
"But this faculty [Reason] has been much perverted, often to vile, and often to insignificant purposes; sometimes chained like a slave or malefactor, and sometimes soaring in forbidden and unknown regions."
Metaphor in Context
It is strange to observe, with what reluctance some people acknowledge the power of instinct. That man is governed by reason, and the brutes by instinct, is a favourite topic with some philosophers; who, like other froward children, spurn the hand that leads them, and desire, above all things, to be left at their own disposal. Were this boast founded in truth, it might be supposed to mean little more, than that man is governed by himself, and the brutes by their Maker. But, luckily for man, it is not founded in truth, but in ignorance, inattention, and self-conceit. Our instincts, as well as our rational powers, are far superior, both in number and dignity, to those which the brutes enjoy; and it were well for us, on many occasions, if we laid our systems aside, and were more attentive in observing these impulses of nature in which reason has no part. Far be it from me to speak with disrespect of any of the gifts of God; every work of his is good; but the best things, when abused, may become pernicious. Reason is a noble faculty, and when kept within its proper sphere, and applied to useful purposes, proves a mean of exalting human creatures almost to the rank of superior beings. But this faculty has been much perverted, often to vile, and often to insignificant purposes; sometimes chained like a slave or malefactor, and sometimes soaring in forbidden and unknown regions. No wonder, then, if it hath been frequently made the instrument of seducing and bewildering mankind, and of rendering philosophy contemptible.
(I.i, p. 47-8)
(I.i, p. 47-8)
Categories
Provenance
Searching in Google Books
Citation
10 entries in ESTC (1770, 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, 1777, 1778).
Beattie, James. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: A Kincaid & J. Bell, 1770). <Link to ECCO>
Text from corrected and enlarged second edition of 1771. <Link to Google Books>
Beattie, James. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: A Kincaid & J. Bell, 1770). <Link to ECCO>
Text from corrected and enlarged second edition of 1771. <Link to Google Books>
Date of Entry
09/29/2011
