Belsham, William (1752-1827)

On Liberty and Necessity [from Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary]

London

Printed for C. Dilly

1789

"But if it means the mental energy preceding and producing volition, it is then plainly equivalent to the term motive, and the question is reduced to a mere verbal controversy; for this mental energy, denoting only a particular disposition and state of mind, must itself have resulted from a previous disposition of mind, as likewise that previous disposition from one yet more remote:--a regular and uninterrupted concatenation of volitions thus extending itself backwards to the original source of agency, each volition or mental state, like wave impelling wave, arising from preceding, and giving rise to succeeding states or definite situations of mind analogous to itself, and corresponding to those immutable laws by which the mental no less than the material world is governed by infinite wisdom and power."

The Necessarians, far from being silenced by these popular and specious reasonings, with great ardour and confidence thus resume the argument:--It is acknowledged, say they, by our opponents,then,that nothing can come into existence without a cause. All the affections, emotions, and feelings of the mind, however modified and however distinguished, are the real and genuine effects of some real and adequate cause. The question therefore to be decided is this, "Whether those mental affections are produced by a regular concatenation of circumstances or motives operating as real and adequate causes, or whether they are the result of a certain faculty of the mind fortunately discovered for this very purpose, and dignified with the appellation of the self-determining power." He who affirms that the self-determining power is the cause of volition, must doubtless intend to convey some farther idea than that the power by which our volitions are determined is the cause of volition; for this is a mere identical proposition, which can never be seriously proposed as the subject of philosophical discussion.--By the self-determining power therefore must be meant, if indeed it has any meaning, either the actual exertion of volition, or the mental energy which precedes volition, and which is the efficient cause of it. If it means the actual exertion of volition, then the assertors of this power evidently confound the cause with the effect, making the act of volition prior to itself, distinct from itself, and the cause of itself. But if it means the mental energy preceding and producing volition, it is then plainly equivalent to the term motive, and the question is reduced to a mere verbal controversy; for this mental energy, denoting only a particular disposition and state of mind, must itself have resulted from a previous disposition of mind, as likewise that previous disposition from one yet more remote:--a regular and uninterrupted concatenation of volitions thus extending itself backwards to the original source of agency, each volition or mental state, like wave impelling wave, arising from preceding, and giving rise to succeeding states or definite situations of mind analogous to itself, and corresponding to those immutable laws by which the mental no less than the material world is governed by infinite wisdom and power.--But the term motive, according to the Necessarian definition, includes all those previous circumstances which contribute to produce a definite volition or determination of the will.--To what purpose then attempt to distinguish between the power and the motive of determination, when the ideas precisely coincide; the definite cause of a definite volition being all which is really meant by either?--Or where is the difference between the Libertarian, who says that the mind chuses the motive; and the Necessarian, who asserts that the motive determines the mind; if the volition be the necessary result of all the previous circumstances?--The distinction in this case can only amount to an idle and trifling evasion; and it is evident, that in order to preserve a shadow of liberty, its advocates make no scruple to adopt a gross impropriety of expression: to boast, that the mind chuses the motive when the mind is restricted to a definite choice, is ridiculous; and it is in fact as great a solecism, as to affirm that the volition chuses the motive: for the choice of the mind is not prior, but subsequent to the motive; it is therefore not the cause, but the effect of the motive; and this pretended mental choice is manifestly neither more nor less than the necessary determination of volition.
(pp. 9-12)

Liquid::Ocean::Waves

Reading in Google Books

William Belsham, Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary (London: Printed for C. Dilly, 1789). <Link to Google Books>

08/24/2011