"Rather the little man stands as a representative pro tem for psychological faculties which mediate the integration of shoe-tying behavior by applying information about how shoes are tied."

— Fodor, Jerry (b. 1935)


Date
1968
Metaphor
"Rather the little man stands as a representative pro tem for psychological faculties which mediate the integration of shoe-tying behavior by applying information about how shoes are tied."
Metaphor in Context
But this sort of objection is irrelevant to the explanation I had envisaged. For my theory included a specification of instructions for tying one's shoes, and it was there that its explanatory power lay. In my story, appeals to the little man do not function as a way to avoid explaining how we tie our shoes. Rather the little man stands as a representative pro tem for psychological faculties which mediate the integration of shoe-tying behavior by applying information about how shoes are tied. I know of no correct psychological theory that offers a specification of these faculties. Assigning psychological functions to little men makes explicit our inability to provide an account of the mechanisms that mediate those functions.
(pp. 628-9)
Categories
Provenance
Reading
Citation
Jerry Fodor, "The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 20 (Oct. 24, 1968): pp. 627-640. <Link to JSTOR>
Theme
Homunculus
Date of Entry
05/20/2011

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.