"There seems here a necessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not spectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, like sun-shine or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, (to carry our pretensions no higher), communicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination."
— Hume, David (1711-1776)
Author
Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed for A. Millar
Date
1751, 1777
Metaphor
"There seems here a necessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not spectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, like sun-shine or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, (to carry our pretensions no higher), communicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination."
Metaphor in Context
It seems, indeed, certain, that first appearances are here, as usual, extremely deceitful, and that it is more difficult, in a speculative way, to resolve into self-love the merit, which we ascribe to the selfish virtues above-mentioned, than that even of the social virtues, justice and beneficence. For this latter purpose, we need but say, that whatever conduct promotes the good of the community is loved, praised, and esteemed by the community, on account of that utility and interest, of which every one partakes: And though this affection and regard be, in reality, gratitude, not self-love, yet a distinction, even of this obvious nature, may not readily be made by superficial reasoners; and there is room, at least, to support the cavil and dispute for a moment. But as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their possessor, without any reference to us, or to the community, are yet esteemed and valued; by what theory or system can we account for this sentiment from self-love, or deduce it from that favourite origin? There seems here a necessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not spectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, like sun-shine or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, (to carry our pretensions no higher), communicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail among all speculative enquirers.
(pp. 243-4)
(pp. 243-4)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
Working from Nidditch's census and confirming 3 entries through the ESTC (1751, 1753, 1760, 1764, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1772, 1777).
First published as An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. By David Hume, Esq (London: Printed for A. Millar, 1751). <Link to ECCO><Link to ECCO-TCP>
Text from David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975).
First published as An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. By David Hume, Esq (London: Printed for A. Millar, 1751). <Link to ECCO><Link to ECCO-TCP>
Text from David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975).
Date of Entry
03/05/2011