"The notion of sameness-with-something-else is in fact one of the 'fringes' in which a substantive mental kernel-of-content can appear enveloped."
— James, William (1842-1910)
Author
Date
January, 1884
Metaphor
"The notion of sameness-with-something-else is in fact one of the 'fringes' in which a substantive mental kernel-of-content can appear enveloped."
Metaphor in Context
A word about the back-bone of the human mind, the psychological principle of identity, will help us here. Logic and ontology both have their principles of identity, but the psychological principle is different from either, being a highly, synthetic proposition, which affirms that different mental acts can contemplate, mean to contemplate, and know that they mean to contemplate, the same objective matter, quality, thing or truth. The notion of sameness-with-something-else is in fact one of the "fringes" in which a substantive mental kernel-of-content can appear enveloped. The same reality, as we call the kernel, can, then, by virtue of this principle, be thought in widely differing ways. Some of these ways are complete ways, the others are relatively incomplete ways. As a rule, the more substantive and sensational a way is, the more complete we usually suppose it to be.
(pp. 21-2)
(pp. 21-2)
Categories
Provenance
Reading
Citation
James, William. Mind, Vol. 9, No. 33 (Jan., 1884), pp. 1-26. <Link to JSTOR>
Date of Entry
02/09/2010
