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"But to accuse or excuse is the office of a faculty which can neither will nor chuse, that is, of the conscience, which is properly a record, a book, and a judgment-seat."

— Taylor, Jeremy (bap. 1613, 1667)

Author

Taylor, Jeremy (bap. 1613, 1667)

Work Title

Ductor Dubitantium, or, The Rule of Conscience in all her General Measures Serving as a Great Instrument for the Determination of Cases of Conscience

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed by R. Norton for R. Royston

Date

1660, 1676

Metaphor

"But to accuse or excuse is the office of a faculty which can neither will nor chuse, that is, of the conscience, which is properly a record, a book, and a judgment-seat."

Metaphor in Context

12. Conscience relies not at all upon the will directly. For though a Conscience is good or bad, pure or impure; and so the Doctors of Mystic Theologie divide and handle it, yet a conscience is not made so by the will, formally, but by the understanding. For that is a good conscience, which is rightly taught in the word of life ; that is impure and defiled, which hath entertained evil and ungodly principles; such is theirs, who follow false lights, evil teachers, men of corrupt minds. For the conscience is a Judge and a Guide, a Monitor and a Witness, which are the offices of the knowing, not of the chusing faculty. Spiritum, correctorem, & paedagogum anima, so Origen calls it. The instructor of the Soul, the spirit, the corrector. Naturale judicatorium, or naturalis vis judicandi, so S. Basil. The natural power of judging, or natures judgment-seat. Lucem intellectus nostri, so Damascen calls it, The light of our understanding. The conscience does accuse or excuse a man before God, which the will cannot. If it could, we should all stand upright at doomesday, or at least those would be acquitted, who fain would do well, but miss, who do the things they love not, and love those they do not; that is, they who strive to enter in, but shall not be able. But to accuse or excuse is the office of a faculty which can neither will nor chuse, that is, of the conscience, which is properly a record, a book, and a judgment-seat.
(p. 4)