"I believe it was your colleague Hospers who proposed this useful figure: that whereas both thoughts and words have meaning, just as both the sun and moon send light to us, the meaning of the words is related to the meaning of the thoughts just as the light of the moon is related to that of the sun."
— Chisholm, Roderick (1916-1999)
Work Title
Place of Publication
Minneapolis
Publisher
University of Minnesota Press
Date
1958
Metaphor
"I believe it was your colleague Hospers who proposed this useful figure: that whereas both thoughts and words have meaning, just as both the sun and moon send light to us, the meaning of the words is related to the meaning of the thoughts just as the light of the moon is related to that of the sun."
Metaphor in Context
When the question is put this way, I should think the plausible answer is that it's the living things that are peculiar, not the noises and marks. I believe it was your colleague Hospers who proposed this useful figure: that whereas both thoughts and words have meaning, just as both the sun and moon send light to us, the meaning of the words is related to the meaning of the thoughts just as the light of the moon is related to that of the sun. Extinguish the living things and the noises and marks wouldn't shine any more. But if you extinguish the noises and marks, people can still think about things (but not so well, of course). Surely it would be unfounded psychological dogma to say that infants, mutes, and animals cannot have beliefs and desires until they are able to use language.
(p. 524)
(p. 524)
Categories
Provenance
Reading Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 27n.
Citation
Roderick M. Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental." Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. vol. II. Ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. pp. 507-539. <:Link to PDFs at Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science>
Date of Entry
10/22/2004
Date of Review
03/15/2009