« back to search

"Repeating Locke's metaphor, Kant blames Hume for declaring certain questions to lie beyond the 'horizon' of human knowledge, without determining where that horizon falls."

— Baldwin, James Mark (1861-1934)

Author

Baldwin, James Mark (1861-1934)

Work Title

Double Aspect Theory [from Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology]

Date

1901

Metaphor

"Repeating Locke's metaphor, Kant blames Hume for declaring certain questions to lie beyond the 'horizon' of human knowledge, without determining where that horizon falls."

Metaphor in Context

In modern times, epistemology first steps into the foreground with Locke, whose Essay, according to its author's own account, had its origin in 'the difficulties that rose on every side' in the course of a metaphysical discussion. Whereupon, says Locke, 'it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with' (Epistle to the Reader). In the introductory chapter he emphasizes in similar language the necessity of a theory of knowledge as a preliminary to metaphysical inquiry. 'Till that was done,' he continues, 'I suspected we began at the wrong end. . . . Extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that men raise questions and multiply disputes which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase these doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and the dark parts of things -- between what is and what is not comprehensible by us -- men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other' (I. i. 7). The design of the Essay is, accordingly, in his own words, to inquire into 'the certainty, evidence, and extent' of our knowledge, and at the same time 'to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasions' (I. i. 3). In these and other similar passages Locke impressed upon succeeding English philosophy its predominantly epistemological character. It will also be noted that they express the epistemological question in its characteristically modern form, as referring to the limits of human knowledge -- the form in which it meets us in Hume and Kant, Comte and Spencer. Kant's description of dogmatic metaphysics as the arena of endless contests, comparable to the shadow-fights of the heroes in Walhalla, and his idea of criticism' as the science which is to determine 'the extent, validity, and worth' of our a priori cognitions, and thus to settle the question as to the possibility or impossibility of 'metaphysics,' repeat almost verbally Locke's conception of his own enterprise, though the execution in the two cases is of course different. Repeating Locke's metaphor, Kant blames Hume for declaring certain questions to lie beyond the 'horizon' of human knowledge, without determining where that horizon falls. 'He (Hume) merely declared the understanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were; he created a general distrust of the power of our faculties, without giving us any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our unavoidable ignorance.' As contrasted with scepticism, criticism does not 'examine the facta of reason, but reason itself in the whole extent of its powers, and in regard to its capacity of a priori cognition; and thus we determine, not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits' (see Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to First Edition, Introduction, and Transcendental Doctrine of Method, chap. i).