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Epicurus "fancied, that an infinite multitude of subtle images; some flowing from bodies, some formed in the air of their own accord, and others made up of different things variously combined, are always moving up and down around us: and that these images, being of extreme fineness, penetrate our bodies, and, striking upon the mind, give rise to that mode of perception which we call Imagination."

— Beattie, James (1735-1803)

Author

Beattie, James (1735-1803)

Work Title

Of Dreaming [from Dissertations Moral and Critical]

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for W. Strahan; and T. Cadell ... and W. Creech

Date

1783

Metaphor

Epicurus "fancied, that an infinite multitude of subtle images; some flowing from bodies, some formed in the air of their own accord, and others made up of different things variously combined, are always moving up and down around us: and that these images, being of extreme fineness, penetrate our bodies, and, striking upon the mind, give rise to that mode of perception which we call Imagination."

Metaphor in Context

I shall not trouble the reader with the opinions of the antients, in regard to the immediate cause of Dreaming. Epicurus fancied, that an infinite multitude of subtle images; some flowing from bodies, some formed in the air of their own accord, and others made up of [end page 208] different things variously combined, are always moving up and down around us: and that these images, being of extreme fineness, penetrate our bodies, and, striking upon the mind, give rise to that mode of perception which we call Imagination, and to which he refers the origin both of our dreams, and of our thought when we are awake. Aristotle seems to think, that every object of sense makes, upon the human soul, or upon some part of our frame, a certain impression; which remains for some time after the object that made it is gone; and which, being afterwards recognized by the mind in sleep, gives rise to those visionary images that then present themselves.--These opinions, if one were to examine them, would be found, either to amount to nothing that can be understood; or to ascribe to human thought a sort of material or bodily nature, which to me is perfectly inconceivable.
(pp. 208-9)