"To account for this, and other phenomena of Memory, by intermediate causes, many authors, both antient and modern, were fain to suppose, that every thing perceived by us, whether a thought of the mind, or an external object, every thing, in a word, that we remember, makes upon the brain a certain impression, which, remaining for some time after, is taken notice of by the mind, and recognized as the mark of that particular sensation or idea."

— Beattie, James (1735-1803)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed for W. Strahan; and T. Cadell ... and W. Creech
Date
1783
Metaphor
"To account for this, and other phenomena of Memory, by intermediate causes, many authors, both antient and modern, were fain to suppose, that every thing perceived by us, whether a thought of the mind, or an external object, every thing, in a word, that we remember, makes upon the brain a certain impression, which, remaining for some time after, is taken notice of by the mind, and recognized as the mark of that particular sensation or idea."
Metaphor in Context
To account for this, and other phenomena of Memory, by intermediate causes, many authors, both antient and modern, were fain to suppose, that every thing perceived by us, whether a thought of the mind, or an external object, every thing, in a word, that we remember, makes upon the brain a certain impression, which, remaining for some time after, is taken notice of by the mind, and recognized as the mark of that particular sensation or idea; and that this sensation or idea, thus obtruded upon us anew, gives rise to remembrance. They supposed further, that attention to the thing durable; while that, to which we slightly attend, makes but a slight impression that soon wears out. When the brain itself is disordered, by disease, by drunkenness, or by other accidents, these philosophers are of opinion, that the impressions are disfigured, or instantly erased, or not at all received; in which case, there is either no remembrance, or a confused one: and they think, that the brains of old men, grown callous by length of time, are, like hard wax, equally tenacious of old impressions, and unsusceptible of new. Many plausible things may indeed be said, for solving the difficulties above mentioned, if we will only admit this theory. But it must, notwithstanding, be rejected; and that for several good reasons.
(II.i, p. 10)
Categories
Provenance
Reading
Citation
At least 2 entries in ESTC (1783).

Beattie, James. Dissertations Moral and Critical (London: Printed for Strahan, Cadell, and Creech, 1783). Facsimile-Reprint: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1970. <Link to Google Books>
Date of Entry
07/25/2005
Date of Review
01/28/2012

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.