"Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind."
— Hume, David (1711-1776)
Author
Work Title
Place of Publication
London
Publisher
A. Millar
Date
1748, 1777
Metaphor
"Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind."
Metaphor in Context
It seems evident, that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity, or connexion.
(p. 82)
(p. 82)
Categories
Provenance
Reading
Citation
Working from Nidditch's census, and also confirming entries in the ESTC (1748, 1750, 1751, 1756, 1758, 1760, 1764, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1772, 1777).
First published as Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (London: Printed for A Millar, 1748). <Link to ECCO><Link to ECCO-TCP><Link to 1748 edition in Google Books> "Second edition" in 1750, "third edition" in 1756. First titled An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1758.
In ECCO-TCP, see also Essays and Treatises: on Several Subjects. By David Hume, Esq, 4 vols. (London: Printed for A. Millar; and A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, at Edinburgh, 1760). <Link to vol. III>
Text from David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 3rd edition. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge; P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Note, Nidditch reproduces the the second volume of the posthumous edition of 1777, which he has collated with the preceding 1772 edition.
First published as Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (London: Printed for A Millar, 1748). <Link to ECCO><Link to ECCO-TCP><Link to 1748 edition in Google Books> "Second edition" in 1750, "third edition" in 1756. First titled An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1758.
In ECCO-TCP, see also Essays and Treatises: on Several Subjects. By David Hume, Esq, 4 vols. (London: Printed for A. Millar; and A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, at Edinburgh, 1760). <Link to vol. III>
Text from David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 3rd edition. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge; P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Note, Nidditch reproduces the the second volume of the posthumous edition of 1777, which he has collated with the preceding 1772 edition.
Date of Entry
10/05/2005
