"And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far."

— Hume, David (1711-1776)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
A. Millar
Date
1748, 1777
Metaphor
"And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far."
Metaphor in Context
Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and enquiry. This task of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.
(p. 13)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
Working from Nidditch's census, and also confirming entries in the ESTC (1748, 1750, 1751, 1756, 1758, 1760, 1764, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1772, 1777).

First published as Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (London: Printed for A Millar, 1748). <Link to ECCO><Link to ECCO-TCP><Link to 1748 edition in Google Books> "Second edition" in 1750, "third edition" in 1756. First titled An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1758.

In ECCO-TCP, see also Essays and Treatises: on Several Subjects. By David Hume, Esq, 4 vols. (London: Printed for A. Millar; and A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, at Edinburgh, 1760). <Link to vol. III>

Text from David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 3rd edition. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge; P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Note, Nidditch reproduces the the second volume of the posthumous edition of 1777, which he has collated with the preceding 1772 edition.
Date of Entry
10/05/2005

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.