"You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax."

— Berkeley, George (1685-1753)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed by G. James, for Henry Clements
Date
1713, 1734
Metaphor
"You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax."
Metaphor in Context
HYLAS. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense therefore are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my substratum.

PHILONOUS. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind or imprinted on the senses; I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material substratum intelligible, I would fain know.

HYLAS. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

PHILONOUS. None at all: it is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorized: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is there any thing in this, but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c. which being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross original sense.
(Vol ii, p. 241)


Provenance
Past Masters
Citation
5 entries in ESTC (1713, 1725, 1734, 1776, 1777).

See Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous: The Design of Which Is Plainly to Demonstrate the Reality and Perfection of Human Knowledge, the Incorporeal Nature of the Soul, and the Immediate Providence of a Deity: In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Also to Open a Method for Rendering the Sciences More Easy, Useful, and Compendious. (London: Printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in S. Paul’s Church-Yard, 1713). <Link to ESTC><Link to ECCO-TCP>

Working with the Past Masters electronic version of The Works of George Berkeley, ed. T. E. Jessop and A. A. Luce, vol. II (Desirée Park: Thomas Nelson, 1979).
Date of Entry
02/26/2004

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.