"Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles: and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow."

— Berkeley, George (1685-1753)


Place of Publication
Dublin
Publisher
Printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat
Date
1710, 1734
Metaphor
"Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles: and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow."
Metaphor in Context
Every particular finite extension, which may possibly be the object of our thought, is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If therefore I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it: but it is evident, that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to my self in my mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me, than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas, and it is no less plain, that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny any thing of it. But if the terms extension, parts, and the like, are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas; then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number, is so manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so. And it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature, who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles: and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.
(Part I, §124, p. 98)
Provenance
Past Masters
Citation
George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge: Wherein the chief cause of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion are inquired Into (Dublin: printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremey Pepyet, 1710). <Link to ECCO>

See also Tonson's London edition: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Wherein the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are Inquired Into. First Printed in the Year 1710. To Which are Added Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Scepticks and Atheists. First Printed in the Year 1713. Both Written by George Berkeley, M. A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin (London: Jacob Tonson, 1734). <Link to ECCO>

Text from Past Masters digitized version, based on second edition of 1734. From The Works of George Berkeley, ed. T. E. Jessop and A. A. Luce, vol. ii (Desirée Park: Thomas Nelson, 1979).
Date of Entry
02/18/2004

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.