"But neither can this be said; for though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind."

— Berkeley, George (1685-1753)


Place of Publication
Dublin
Publisher
Printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat
Date
1710, 1734
Metaphor
"But neither can this be said; for though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind."
Metaphor in Context
But though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds, can be no reason why we should suppose matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.
(Part I, §19, p. 49)
Provenance
Past Masters
Citation
George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge: Wherein the chief cause of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion are inquired Into (Dublin: printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremey Pepyet, 1710). <Link to ECCO>

See also Tonson's London edition: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Wherein the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are Inquired Into. First Printed in the Year 1710. To Which are Added Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Scepticks and Atheists. First Printed in the Year 1713. Both Written by George Berkeley, M. A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin (London: Jacob Tonson, 1734). <Link to ECCO>

Text from Past Masters digitized version, based on second edition of 1734. From The Works of George Berkeley, ed. T. E. Jessop and A. A. Luce, vol. ii (Desirée Park: Thomas Nelson, 1979).
Date of Entry
02/18/2004
Date of Review
03/02/2012

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.