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But if ideas "remain in the Soul when I was only thinking of a Horse, whereever they are bestow'd, it may be presum'd, there is room for that one idea more without thrusting out another to give it place: and when that one is among them, I see no more reason why they must be all new imprest, than that the others must have been new imprest when I only thought of that one unless, it be suppos'd that the Soul has always, just one idea [more] than there is place for in the repository of its Ideas; and if that happen to crou'd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for Air."

— Trotter, Catherine, later Cockburn, (1674?-1749)

Author

Trotter, Catherine, later Cockburn, (1674?-1749)

Work Title

A Defence of the Essay of Human Understanding,

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for Will Turner and John Nutt

Date

1702

Metaphor

But if ideas "remain in the Soul when I was only thinking of a Horse, whereever they are bestow'd, it may be presum'd, there is room for that one idea more without thrusting out another to give it place: and when that one is among them, I see no more reason why they must be all new imprest, than that the others must have been new imprest when I only thought of that one unless, it be suppos'd that the Soul has always, just one idea [more] than there is place for in the repository of its Ideas; and if that happen to crou'd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for Air."

Metaphor in Context

But if the Remarker thinks, that if all our thoughts cease in sound Sleep, all our Ideas are extinct, and must be new imprest; I desire him to consider, when a Sleeping or Waking Man thinks, what becomes of all those Ideas which he does not actually perceive in his own mind, for the mind is capable of taking notice but of very few at once: Must not all the rest by this Argument be extinct? And so we must have them new Imprest; and are as it were, New Born when ever we have any Ideas which we have not always actually perceiv'd, i.e. every time we pass from one thought to another. This is a sure consequence, if when all our thoughts cease, all our Ideas must be new imprest, unless a Man cou'd actually perceive all the Ideas he ever had at once; for his having only one thought in his mind, can no more keep any other there, or excite any other that it has no connexion with, than if he had no thought at all: I am thinking for Example, in my Sleep, of a Horse; his Beauty, Strength, and Usefulness: Does this thought preserve in my mind, the Ideas of a Church, of Happiness or Misery? Or can it help me to any of them, when I have occasion for them? If not, then these Ideas must be new imprest when I awake; but if they remain in the Soul when I was only thinking of a Horse, whereever they are bestow'd, it may be presum'd, there is room for that one idea more without thrusting out another to give it place: and when that one is among them, I see no more reason why they must be all new imprest, than that the others must have been new imprest when I only thought of that one unless, it be suppos'd that the Soul has always, just one idea [more] than there is place for in the repository of its Ideas; and if that happen to crou'd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for Air.
(pp. 33-4)