text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"[...] I believe it would shame their Choice, if they duly consider'd what Empty Toys they pursu'd, and preferr'd before this Solid and Substantial Good. PHILOSOPHY, truly such, and rightly understood, is far from being such a Frightful Thing as their Imagination paints it; being only Plain, Natural Reason, Polish'd, Better'd and Elevated by Art and Reflexion: So that they who check at the Knowledge of Philosophy, ought, with much better Reason, find fault with the Teaching Persons of Quality to Sing, Dance or Play on the Lute: Unless they think it very Prudent, and Expedient, to give our Voice, Feet and Fingers the best Advantages we can, to perform their Actions artificially, and exactly; but, that 'tis a very Needless Folly to perfect the Knowing Power of our Soul; and wondrous Wise, to let it still doze on sluggishly, in its Home-spun Native Rudeness, and lie wholly Uncultivated. Nay, such Gentlemen would be much offended their Houses should not be clean Swept, and Garnish'd; yet, they are not, in the least, concern'd, that Cobwebs should hang in the Windows of their Intellect, and Dusty Ignorance dim and blear the Sight of the Noble Inhabitant.",2013-04-02 02:26:19 UTC,"""Nay, such Gentlemen would be much offended their Houses should not be clean Swept, and Garnish'd; yet, they are not, in the least, concern'd, that Cobwebs should hang in the Windows of their Intellect, and Dusty Ignorance dim and blear the Sight of the Noble Inhabitant.""",2013-04-02 02:26:19 UTC,"","",,Inhabitants and Rooms,"",Reading,20080,7370
"'Tis the Business of this following Paper, to let you into the Certain Knowledge, what Kind of Propositions are the First Principles, and the Rule of Knowing all Truth whatever. The First Step we take into our Inmost Thoughts, we meet with and discover these Primary Truths: whose Self-Evidence is the Earliest Light that dawns to our Soul, as soon as over her Power of Knowing awakens into Action. 'Tis a Subject, tho' most Necessary, and of the highest Influence, yet neglected by Writers hitherto. Two or three have, indeed, spoken of it; but, none I know of, has handl'd it professedly, and at large. Tho' it be Dry, and requires Chawing ere it becomes Nutritive; yet, I dare presume, it is Solid, and not at all Windy. Even, Seeds, when first planted, are Dry; which, yet, hinders them not from yielding a Large Increase afterwards: The First Principles are the Seeds of all Truths; which, by how much their Roots are laid Deeper, so much Higher they Rear and Extend their Branches. The Present I offer you, is Small; but the Little it contains, (as far as concerns this Subject,) is wrought entirely out of Natural and Reflected Reason, without being beholding at all to the Dishonourable Task of Transcribing; as some Pieces, I could name, are. I dare undertake, that the Reasons produc'd here, are so firmly Grounded, that they can fear no Opposition but Drollery, the last Effort of Nonplust Reason. You will not expect Fine Language, in a Matter that cannot bear it. Self-Evidence is so brightly Luminous, that nothing can make it more Glossy: Nor is all the Eloquence in the World able to do these First Truths any Service at all: All Attempts to burnish or varnish them, do, instead of doing this, dawb and hide them; as Painting does a Perfect Beauty. [...]",2013-04-02 02:27:56 UTC,"""The First Step we take into our Inmost Thoughts, we meet with and discover these Primary Truths: whose Self-Evidence is the Earliest Light that dawns to our Soul, as soon as over her Power of Knowing awakens into Action.""",2013-04-02 02:27:56 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20081,7370
"2. I must confess, Dear Sir, That when I heard you discourse, you did it so ingeniously in the Cartesian Way of Wit, which consists in Explicating and Doubting, and seems to exclude Proving, that I did not see how the Great Cartesius himself could have defended his Doctrine better: For, he could not have Doubted more scrupulously than you did; nor, I think, have Explicated himself more ingeniously. You guarded his Doctrine so warily, that it was scarce possible to attack it. Tho', that I may not flatter you, I cannot say you did this by the Evidence of any Proposition you Advanc'd, but by your Ready Exceptions against any thing that Art or Nature could oppose; at least, taking them as manag'd by one no better skill'd than I am. Your Cause seem'd to me, as if it had been secur'd in some Castle; made Impregnable, not by means of the Ordinary Methods of Fortification, us'd in Lawful War; but, (which is against the Old Laws of Arms,) by a kind of Enchantment. Your Bulwarks, Entrenchments and Redoubts lay so cunningly hid in your Way of Ideas, that they were altogether Invisible; so that the most quick-sighted Engineer living could not discern them, or take any sure Aim at them: Much less such a Dull Eye as mine; who, tho' I bend my Sight as strongly and steadily as I am able, yet I cannot, for my Heart, see what kind of Things those Spiritual Ideas are. And, which leaves me in a helpless Condition as to that Particular, such very Ingenious Cartesians as Mr. Le Grand, who, having por'd so long upon them, should be best acquainted with them, and therefore best qualified to inform me what they are, gives me no Account of them; unless we can think there may be such Things as are made up of Contradictions, and altogether Chimerical. As you may see in the 2d Examen of my Ideae Cartesianae Expensae, ยงยง. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.
(pp. 4-6)",2013-04-02 02:34:58 UTC,"""Your Bulwarks, Entrenchments and Redoubts lay so cunningly hid in your Way of Ideas, that they were altogether Invisible; so that the most quick-sighted Engineer living could not discern them, or take any sure Aim at them: Much less such a Dull Eye as mine; who, tho' I bend my Sight as strongly and steadily as I am able, yet I cannot, for my Heart, see what kind of Things those Spiritual Ideas are.""",2013-04-02 02:34:58 UTC,"","",,"",INTEREST: Shandean? REVISIT and think about Sterne here...,"Reading John Yolton's ""Locke's Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sargent,"" Journal of the History of Ideas 12:4 (October 1951): 537. ",20082,7370
"[...] Nor did Cartesius himself, amongst all the Evident Things he call'd into Doubt, in the least Question the Evidence and Truth of such Propositions, formally express'd: Nor could he have done it, without utterly Destroying, at the same time, the Certainty of all he could have said; nay, even of his own First Principle too; as will be seen hereafter. From all which Considerations, (any One of which might suffice,) I may Safely and Evidently conclude, that, in point of Evidence of its Truth, and Stability of its Grounds, nothing can be any way comparable to the Light which strikes the Eye of our Understanding, by its steady Rays emitted from these Self-evident, or Identical Propositions: Which goes very far to the Entitling These, and These only, to be the Rule of Knowing all Truths, or the First Principles to all Science, in whatever particular Subject; not excepting even Metaphysicks it self.
(pp. 25-6)",2013-04-02 02:36:11 UTC,"""From all which Considerations, (any One of which might suffice,) I may Safely and Evidently conclude, that, in point of Evidence of its Truth, and Stability of its Grounds, nothing can be any way comparable to the Light which strikes the Eye of our Understanding, by its steady Rays emitted from these Self-evident, or Identical Propositions.""",2013-04-02 02:36:11 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20083,7370
"[...] Wherefore, 'tis Evident, that you cannot pretend to see clearly and distinctly, that any Proposition is True, (which is your Rule to know Truth,) but by seeing its said Terms Connected, or Identify'd. I see not how you can, even in your Way of Ideas, deny this Clear Discourse: And, if you grant it, we are thus far Friends. Only, we add, that, to make such Connexions the RULE to all others, you must allow them to be Self-Connexions, or Identical; which is our Position. So that, which way soever you wriggle, to avoid our Rule, the Light of Common Reason, or Natural Logick, will force you into it, whether you will or no.
(p. 48)",2013-04-02 02:37:10 UTC,"""So that, which way soever you wriggle, to avoid our Rule, the Light of Common Reason, or Natural Logick, will force you into it, whether you will or no.""",2013-04-02 02:37:10 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20084,7370
"25. How pretty a Delusive Faculty is this Fancy of ours! and, how apt, if we be not aware, to decoy us, every Step, into Errour, by Customary Appearances; which, by striking often upon it, would fool our Reason! Our own Thoughts, and those of others, do, in all our Conversations, use to come to us, clad in Words: Whence it happens, that 'tis very hard, liquidly and clearly to strip the Sense from those Words; and to consider It, and nothing but It. If a Man says, [Every Thing is Distinct from all other Things,] none is apt to smile at him, or impute it as Ridiculous, or Foolish: But, if he says, [A Thing is its self,] Witty Men can scarce contain their Iest at such an Idle Proposition: And yet they are, most evidently, the self-same in Sense; for, that which is Distinct from all others, must either be its Self, or Nothing; and, the taking away all Distinction, does, almost in Terms, at least, most formally, and necessarily, put Identity. Let us take another Instance: If one says, [A Whole is more than a Part,] it appears to such Men, wondrous Wise; and, none blames him, in the least, that says it, or lays it for a Principle. But, if he says, and puts for a Principle, [What's more than a Part, is more than a Part,] it is good Luck if they do not think he deserves Midas's Ears. Yet, both of these Propositions are the self-same, and both of them equally, and most perfectly Identical in Sense; and only differ in the Manner of Expression. Which I thus shew: A Whole consists of its Parts; and, since every Thing is that of which it consists, A Whole is its Parts. But, the Word [Parts,] being Plural, signifies more than One Part; Wherefore, [A Whole is more than a Part,] is the same as to say, [What's more than a Part, is more than a Part;] which is as perfectly Identical, as can be imagin'd. Nay, more; If we regard it well, we shall find, that the former Proposition had not been known, Speculatively, to be Self-evident, nor could have been made out to be such, but because it is the same with this later, whose Terms are most formally Identical; to which, the other is easily reduc'd.
(pp. 49-51)",2013-04-02 02:38:38 UTC,"""Our own Thoughts, and those of others, do, in all our Conversations, use to come to us, clad in Words: Whence it happens, that 'tis very hard, liquidly and clearly to strip the Sense from those Words; and to consider It, and nothing but It.""",2013-04-02 02:38:38 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20085,7370
"28. Again; This Object, which you Clearly and Distinctly see to be True, must be some Mental Proposition; for, nothing can be Formally True, but some Speech that Affirms, or Denies. Now, say we, 'tis most incontestable, that the First Proposition we can make of a Thing, is, to affirm its Metaphysical Verity; or, to say, 'Tis this, (or its self,) and no other: For, the Subject being the Basis of all our Thoughts, we must fix it certainly, Clearly and Distinctly, ere we can, with Certainty, say any thing else of it. This Proposition, then, say we, is such, that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule. It remains then, that you shew us some Truth, or Proposition, which is before this, (which we think to be the First,) and which both makes it self thus Visible; and also, by its Selfevident Light, gives Clearness and Intelligibility to all other Truths; and, lastly, which is so Firmly Grounded, that it may be a Solid First Principle, and not an Aery and Phantastick Conceit. You must then, (we say,) produce, and shew us some other Proposition than that you have brought hitherto, which tells us your Clear and Distinct Perception is your Rule; for, this, you see, is already, by many Unanswerable Arguments, thrown out of doors, and shewn Unfit to be a Rule. And, till you do this, you ought not to be offended, if we tell you friendly, and plainly, that you have no Rule of Truth at all.
(pp. 57-8)",2013-04-02 02:39:54 UTC,"""This Proposition, then, say we, is such, that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule.""",2013-04-02 02:39:54 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20086,7370
"[...] This, then, unanswerably concludes ours to be the Genuin Rule of Truth; in regard, this must be such as all Men must be forc'd to Assent to, unanimously Agree in it, nor can ever hap to be Deceiv'd in it by any Chance whatever: Since, otherwise, the whole Nature of those Men would be Depraved, and good for nothing, as having no Rule by which to know any Truth whatever. Nay, it must be such as may be produc'd openly, by the Asserters of any Truth; that, by alledging It, they may be able to convince others, that what they maintain is a Real Truth, and not some Phantastick Conceit of their own; without which, their Clear and Distinct Perception is Invisible, and so can satisfie no Man; nor clear themselves from being Self-conceited; but, to argue like Phanaticks, who pretend they discern Things by an Inward Light, which none can see but themselves, nor they themselves make it visible to others. Of which, more hereafter.
(p. 62)",2013-04-02 02:41:49 UTC,"""Nay, it must be such as may be produc'd openly, by the Asserters of any Truth; that, by alledging It, they may be able to convince others, that what they maintain is a Real Truth, and not some Phantastick Conceit of their own; without which, their Clear and Distinct Perception is Invisible, and so can satisfie no Man; nor clear themselves from being Self-conceited; but, to argue like Phanaticks, who pretend they discern Things by an Inward Light, which none can see but themselves, nor they themselves make it visible to others.""",2013-04-02 02:41:49 UTC,"",Inwardness,,"","",Reading,20087,7370
"36. Thus much concerning your Method of Proving by Explicating; or rather, of substituting Explications in the place of Proofs. As for the other part of your Method, which is, your putting Learners to Meditate long and seriously, upon what you have propos'd to them, I lik'd that as ill as I did that of Explicating: And, my Reason is, because, unless Men take Principles along with them, to guide their Thoughts right, and keep an Attentive Eye to them, while they thus Meditate; 'tis to be fear'd, their long Meditating will, by its frequent Dints, so imprint and fix what you have told them, in their Brain; and, at length, make it sink so deep into their Minds, that, whether it be Right or Wrong, it will stick there, as daily Experience shews us; Custom, a Second Nature, having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding, to imbue us with False Impressions, by the oft-reiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable; especially, Ingenious Explications (as was shewn lately) too often serving for Reasons, to those who are not well vers'd in True Logick.
(pp. 77-8)",2013-04-02 02:43:26 UTC,"""And, my Reason is, because, unless Men take Principles along with them, to guide their Thoughts right, and keep an Attentive Eye to them, while they thus Meditate; 'tis to be fear'd, their long Meditating will, by its frequent Dints, so imprint and fix what you have told them, in their Brain; and, at length, make it sink so deep into their Minds, that, whether it be Right or Wrong, it will stick there, as daily Experience shews us; Custom, a Second Nature, having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding, to imbue us with False Impressions, by the oft-reiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable; especially, Ingenious Explications (as was shewn lately) too often serving for Reasons, to those who are not well vers'd in True Logick.""",2013-04-02 02:43:26 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20088,7370
"[...] Nor, consequently, can any stronger Argument be brought, to Demonstrate that this Rule of yours is not the Right one, than 'tis to confess or pretend that it stands in need of, or, even, can admit Assistance, or Light, either from the one, or the other. For, if it can need any Explication, it follows, that it must be something Obscure: And, if it can need Poring and Meditating upon it, ere it be admitted, or can be known, then 'tis far from being most Self-evident: Both which utterly destroy the Nature of such a Rule. For, since we must know all other Truths by It, its Evidence must be the First Thing to be known; and therefore, the Knowledge of its Truth must antecede the Knowlege of all other Truths whatsoever, and be Clearer than They. Which being so manifest, I wonder what Thoughts or Considerations our Explicating or Meditating can suggest, that can do this First Rule of Truth any Service, or give it any Advantage; since, all others being more Obscure than It, they may, indeed, (could they affect it,) impart to it their own greater Obscurity, and make it less Clear and Intelligible than it was; but, can never make it Clearer, as having no greater, but far less Clearness themselves. Lastly, As this pretended Necessity of Explicating, and Meditating, quite degrades yours from being the Genuin, First, and, consequently, the Right Rule of Knowing Truth; so it abets ours, and gives it a Clear Title to be such a Rule, since the Self-evidence of those First Truths, express'd by Identical Propositions, (which is our Rule,) is such, as is both Impossible to be Explicated, and Impossible to need Meditating, to clear it to us; but, at the first Instant we open the Eye of our Mind, it discovers it self fully to all Mankind, to be most True; and, withall, begets, forces and fixes us in a Full and Firm Assent to its Verity.
(pp. 79-80)",2013-04-02 02:44:55 UTC,"""Lastly, As this pretended Necessity of Explicating, and Meditating, quite degrades yours from being the Genuin, First, and, consequently, the Right Rule of Knowing Truth; so it abets ours, and gives it a Clear Title to be such a Rule, since the Self-evidence of those First Truths, express'd by Identical Propositions, (which is our Rule,) is such, as is both Impossible to be Explicated, and Impossible to need Meditating, to clear it to us; but, at the first Instant we open the Eye of our Mind, it discovers it self fully to all Mankind, to be most True; and, withall, begets, forces and fixes us in a Full and Firm Assent to its Verity.""",2013-04-02 02:44:55 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20089,7370