work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3557,"","Reading Klinck, Dennis R. ""Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity."" Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (2006): 123-47. p. 126n.18.",2006-05-29 00:00:00 UTC,"[Conscience is] ""the Lord-Keeper, the Chancellor ... who keepeth a Chancery in the soule of man""
(11)",,9205,•I've included twice: Court and Judge.,"Conscience is ""the Lord-Keeper, the Chancellor ... who keepeth a Chancery in the soule of man""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3556,"","Reading Frederick Kiefer's Writing on the Renaissance Stage: Written Words, Printed Pages, Metaphoric Books. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. p. 113.",2006-10-03 00:00:00 UTC,"[Conscience is] a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determing in Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man.
(41)",,9208,"•I've included five times: Scribe, Register, Viceroy, deputy, Judge.","Conscience is ""a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determingin Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man""","",2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3556,"","Reading Frederick Kiefer's Writing on the Renaissance Stage: Written Words, Printed Pages, Metaphoric Books. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. p. 113.",2006-10-03 00:00:00 UTC,"[Conscience is] a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determing in Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man.
(41)",,9212,"•I've included five times: Scribe, Register, Viceroy, deputy, Judge.","Conscience is ""a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determingin Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man.""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3556,"","Reading Frederick Kiefer's Writing on the Renaissance Stage: Written Words, Printed Pages, Metaphoric Books. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. p. 113.",2006-10-03 00:00:00 UTC,"conscience, as a Scribe or Notary, sitting in the closet of mans heart, with pen in hand, records and keepes a Catalogue, or Diary of all our Doings, of the time when, place where, the manner how they were performed, and that so cleere and evident, that goe where we will, doe what we can, the characters of them cannot be cancelled or razed.
(45)",,9213,"•I've included seven times: Scribe, Notary, Closet, Pen, Catalogue, Diary, Character","""[C]onscience, as a Scribe or Notary, sitting in the closet of mans heart, with pen in hand, records and keepes a Catalogue, or Diary of all our Doings, of the time when, place where, the manner how they were performed, adn that so cleere and evident, that goe where we will, doe what we can, the characters of them cannot be cancelled or razed.""","",2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"Inner senses are three in number, so called, because they be within the brainpan, as common sense, phantasy, memory. Their objects are not only things present, but they perceive the sensible species of things to come, past, absent, such as were before in the sense. This common sense is the judge or moderator of the rest, by whom we discern all differences of objects; for by mine eye I do not know that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who judgeth of sounds and colours: they are but the organs to bring the species to be censured; so that all their objects are his, and all their offices are his. The fore part of the brain is his organ or seat.",,9289,"","""This common sense is the judge or moderator of the rest, by whom we discern all differences of objects; for by mine eye I do not know that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who judgeth of sounds and colours: they are but the organs to bring the species to be censured; so that all their objects are his, and all their offices are his""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:06 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. VII.--Of the inward Senses"
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"The affections of these senses are sleep and waking, common to all sensible creatures. ""Sleep is a rest or binding of the outward senses, and of the common sense, for the preservation of body and soul"" (as Scaliger defines it); for when the common sense resteth, the outward senses rest also. The phantasy alone is free, and his commander reason: as appears by those imaginary dreams, which are of divers kinds, natural, divine, demoniacal, &c., which vary according to humours, diet, actions, objects, &c., of which Artemidorus, Cardanus, and Sambucus, with their several interpretators, have written great volumes. This litigation of senses proceeds from an inhibition of spirits, the way being stopped by which they should come; this stopping is caused of vapours arising out of the stomach, filling the nerves, by which the spirits should be conveyed. When these vapours are spent, the passage is open, and the spirits perform their accustomed duties: so that ""waking is the action and motion of the senses, which the spirits dispersed over all parts cause.""",,9291,"","When common sense rests, ""The phantasy alone is free, and his commander reason: as appears by those imaginary dreams, which are of divers kinds, natural, divine, demoniacal, &c., which vary according to humours, diet, actions, objects, &c., of which Artemidorus, Cardanus, and Sambucus, with their several interpretators, have written great volumes""","",2009-09-14 19:34:06 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. VII.--Of the inward Senses"
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"This moving faculty is the other power of the sensitive soul, which causeth all those inward and outward animal motions in the body. It is divided into two faculties, the power of appetite, and of moving from place to place. This of appetite is threefold, so some will have it; natural, as it signifies any such inclination, as of a stone to fall downward, and such actions as retention, expulsion, which depend not on sense, but are vegetal, as the appetite of meat and drink; hunger and thirst. Sensitive is common to men and brutes. Voluntary, the third, or intellective, which commands the other two in men, and is a curb unto them, or at least should be, but for the most part is captivated and overruled by them; and men are led like beasts by sense, giving reins to their concupiscence and several lusts. For by this appetite the soul is led or inclined to follow that good which the senses shall approve, or avoid that which they hold evil: his object being good or evil, the one he embraceth, the other he rejecteth; according to that aphorism, Omnia appetunt bonum, all things seek their own good, or at least seeming good. This power is inseparable from sense, for where sense is, there are likewise pleasure and pain. His organ is the same with the common sense, and is divided into two powers, or inclinations, concupiscible or irascible: or (as one [991] translates it) coveting, anger invading, or impugning. Concupiscible covets always pleasant and delightsome things, and abhors that which is distasteful, harsh, and unpleasant. Irascible, quasi [992] aversans per iram et odium, as avoiding it with anger and indignation. All affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains, which, although the stoics make light of, we hold natural, and not to be resisted. The good affections are caused by some object of the same nature; and if present, they procure joy, which dilates the heart, and preserves the body: if absent, they cause hope, love, desire, and concupiscence. The bad are simple or mixed: simple for some bad object present, as sorrow, which contracts the heart, macerates the soul, subverts the good estate of the body, hindering all the operations of it, causing melancholy, and many times death itself; or future, as fear. Out of these two arise those mixed affections and passions of anger, which is a desire of revenge; hatred, which is inveterate anger; zeal, which is offended with him who hurts that he loves; and ἐπικαιρεκακία [Greek], a compound affection of joy and hate, when we rejoice at other men's mischief, and are grieved at their prosperity; pride, self-love, emulation, envy, shame, &c., of which elsewhere.
",,9293,•I've included twice: Rule and Subjection and Reins,"""Voluntary, the third, or intellective, which commands the other two in men, and is a curb unto them, or at least should be, but for the most part is captivated and overruled by them; and men are led like beasts by sense, giving reins to their concupiscence and several lusts.""","",2009-09-14 19:34:06 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. VIII.--Of the moving Faculty"
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"Will is the other power of the rational soul, [1015] which covets or avoids such things as have been before judged and apprehended by the understanding. If good, it approves; if evil, it abhors it: so that his object is either good or evil. Aristotle calls this our rational appetite; for as, in the sensitive, we are moved to good or bad by our appetite, ruled and directed by sense; so in this we are carried by reason. Besides, the sensitive appetite hath a particular object, good or bad; this an universal, immaterial: that respects only things delectable and pleasant; this honest. Again, they differ in liberty. The sensual appetite seeing an object, if it be a convenient good, cannot but desire it; if evil, avoid it: but this is free in his essence, [1016] much now depraved, obscured, and fallen from his first perfection; yet in some of his operations still free, as to go, walk, move at his pleasure, and to choose whether it will do or not do, steal or not steal. Otherwise, in vain were laws, deliberations, exhortations, counsels, precepts, rewards, promises, threats and punishments: and God should be the author of sin. But in [1017] spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (except we be regenerate, and led by the Spirit), we are egged on by our natural concupiscence, and there is ἀταξία [Greek], a confusion in our powers, [1018] our whole will is averse from God and his law, not in natural things only, as to eat and drink, lust, to which we are led headlong by our temperature and inordinate appetite,
[1019]Nec nos obniti contra, nec tendere tantum
Sufficimus,--
we cannot resist, our concupiscence is originally bad, our heart evil, the seat of our affections captivates and enforceth our will. So that in voluntary things we are averse from God and goodness, bad by nature, by [1020] ignorance worse, by art, discipline, custom, we get many bad habits: suffering them to domineer and tyrannise over us; and the devil is still ready at hand with his evil suggestions, to tempt our depraved will to some ill-disposed action, to precipitate us to destruction, except our will be swayed and counterpoised again with some divine precepts, and good motions of the spirit, which many times restrain, hinder and check us, when we are in the full career of our dissolute courses. So David corrected himself, when he had Saul at a vantage. Revenge and malice were as two violent oppugners on the one side; but honesty, religion, fear of God, withheld him on the other.
",,9301,"","""So that in voluntary things we are averse from God and goodness, bad by nature, by [1020] ignorance worse, by art, discipline, custom, we get many bad habits: suffering them to domineer and tyrannise over us; and the devil is still ready at hand with his evil suggestions, to tempt our depraved will to some ill-disposed action, to precipitate us to destruction, except our will be swayed and counterpoised again with some divine precepts, and good motions of the spirit, which many times restrain, hinder and check us, when we are in the full career of our dissolute courses""","",2009-09-14 19:34:07 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. XI.--Of the Will"
6667,"",Reading in Google Books,2010-01-21 20:10:41 UTC,"That although I have but troublesome Kingdoms here, yet I may attaine to that Kingdome of Peace in My Heart, and in thy Heaven, which Christ hath Purchased, and thou wilt give to thy Servant (though a Sinner) for my Saviours sake, Amen.
(p. 6)",,17678,"","""That although I have but troublesome Kingdoms here, yet I may attaine to that Kingdome of Peace in My Heart, and in thy Heaven, which Christ hath Purchased, and thou wilt give to thy Servant (though a Sinner) for my Saviours sake, Amen.""","",2010-01-21 20:10:41 UTC,I. Upon His Majesties calling this last Parliament.
7133,"",Reading,2011-12-19 14:36:44 UTC,"Batter my heart, three-person'd God, for you
As yet but knock, breathe, shine, and seek to mend;
That I may rise and stand, o'erthrow me, and bend
Your force to break, blow, burn, and make me new.
I, like an usurp'd town to'another due,
Labor to'admit you, but oh, to no end;
Reason, your viceroy in me, me should defend,
But is captiv'd, and proves weak or untrue.
Yet dearly'I love you, and would be lov'd fain,
But am betroth'd unto your enemy;
Divorce me,'untie or break that knot again,
Take me to you, imprison me, for I,
Except you'enthrall me, never shall be free,
Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.
(ll. 1-14)",,19359,"","""Reason, your viceroy in me, me should defend, / But is captiv'd, and proves weak or untrue.""","",2011-12-19 14:36:44 UTC,""