work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3557,"","Reading Klinck, Dennis R. ""Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity."" Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (2006): 123-47. p. 126n.18.",2006-05-29 00:00:00 UTC,"[Conscience is] ""the Lord-Keeper, the Chancellor ... who keepeth a Chancery in the soule of man""
(11)",,9205,•I've included twice: Court and Judge.,"Conscience is ""the Lord-Keeper, the Chancellor ... who keepeth a Chancery in the soule of man""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3556,"","Reading Frederick Kiefer's Writing on the Renaissance Stage: Written Words, Printed Pages, Metaphoric Books. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. p. 113.",2006-10-03 00:00:00 UTC,"[Conscience is] a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determing in Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man.
(41)",,9208,"•I've included five times: Scribe, Register, Viceroy, deputy, Judge.","Conscience is ""a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determingin Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man""","",2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3556,"","Reading Frederick Kiefer's Writing on the Renaissance Stage: Written Words, Printed Pages, Metaphoric Books. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. p. 113.",2006-10-03 00:00:00 UTC,"[Conscience is] a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determing in Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man.
(41)",,9212,"•I've included five times: Scribe, Register, Viceroy, deputy, Judge.","Conscience is ""a noble and divine power and faculty, planted of God in the substance of a mans soule, working upon it selfe by reflection, and taking exact notice, as a Scribe or Register, and determingin Gods Viceroy and deputy, Judge of all that is in the mind, will, affections, actions, and the whole life of man.""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3556,"","Reading Frederick Kiefer's Writing on the Renaissance Stage: Written Words, Printed Pages, Metaphoric Books. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. p. 113.",2006-10-03 00:00:00 UTC,"conscience, as a Scribe or Notary, sitting in the closet of mans heart, with pen in hand, records and keepes a Catalogue, or Diary of all our Doings, of the time when, place where, the manner how they were performed, and that so cleere and evident, that goe where we will, doe what we can, the characters of them cannot be cancelled or razed.
(45)",,9213,"•I've included seven times: Scribe, Notary, Closet, Pen, Catalogue, Diary, Character","""[C]onscience, as a Scribe or Notary, sitting in the closet of mans heart, with pen in hand, records and keepes a Catalogue, or Diary of all our Doings, of the time when, place where, the manner how they were performed, adn that so cleere and evident, that goe where we will, doe what we can, the characters of them cannot be cancelled or razed.""","",2009-09-14 19:34:02 UTC,""
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"Inner senses are three in number, so called, because they be within the brainpan, as common sense, phantasy, memory. Their objects are not only things present, but they perceive the sensible species of things to come, past, absent, such as were before in the sense. This common sense is the judge or moderator of the rest, by whom we discern all differences of objects; for by mine eye I do not know that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who judgeth of sounds and colours: they are but the organs to bring the species to be censured; so that all their objects are his, and all their offices are his. The fore part of the brain is his organ or seat.",,9289,"","""This common sense is the judge or moderator of the rest, by whom we discern all differences of objects; for by mine eye I do not know that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who judgeth of sounds and colours: they are but the organs to bring the species to be censured; so that all their objects are his, and all their offices are his""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:06 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. VII.--Of the inward Senses"
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"The affections of these senses are sleep and waking, common to all sensible creatures. ""Sleep is a rest or binding of the outward senses, and of the common sense, for the preservation of body and soul"" (as Scaliger defines it); for when the common sense resteth, the outward senses rest also. The phantasy alone is free, and his commander reason: as appears by those imaginary dreams, which are of divers kinds, natural, divine, demoniacal, &c., which vary according to humours, diet, actions, objects, &c., of which Artemidorus, Cardanus, and Sambucus, with their several interpretators, have written great volumes. This litigation of senses proceeds from an inhibition of spirits, the way being stopped by which they should come; this stopping is caused of vapours arising out of the stomach, filling the nerves, by which the spirits should be conveyed. When these vapours are spent, the passage is open, and the spirits perform their accustomed duties: so that ""waking is the action and motion of the senses, which the spirits dispersed over all parts cause.""",,9291,"","When common sense rests, ""The phantasy alone is free, and his commander reason: as appears by those imaginary dreams, which are of divers kinds, natural, divine, demoniacal, &c., which vary according to humours, diet, actions, objects, &c., of which Artemidorus, Cardanus, and Sambucus, with their several interpretators, have written great volumes""","",2009-09-14 19:34:06 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. VII.--Of the inward Senses"
3590,"",Distributed Proofreaders text: produced by Karl Hagen and D. Moynihan.,2006-09-21 00:00:00 UTC,"This moving faculty is the other power of the sensitive soul, which causeth all those inward and outward animal motions in the body. It is divided into two faculties, the power of appetite, and of moving from place to place. This of appetite is threefold, so some will have it; natural, as it signifies any such inclination, as of a stone to fall downward, and such actions as retention, expulsion, which depend not on sense, but are vegetal, as the appetite of meat and drink; hunger and thirst. Sensitive is common to men and brutes. Voluntary, the third, or intellective, which commands the other two in men, and is a curb unto them, or at least should be, but for the most part is captivated and overruled by them; and men are led like beasts by sense, giving reins to their concupiscence and several lusts. For by this appetite the soul is led or inclined to follow that good which the senses shall approve, or avoid that which they hold evil: his object being good or evil, the one he embraceth, the other he rejecteth; according to that aphorism, Omnia appetunt bonum, all things seek their own good, or at least seeming good. This power is inseparable from sense, for where sense is, there are likewise pleasure and pain. His organ is the same with the common sense, and is divided into two powers, or inclinations, concupiscible or irascible: or (as one [991] translates it) coveting, anger invading, or impugning. Concupiscible covets always pleasant and delightsome things, and abhors that which is distasteful, harsh, and unpleasant. Irascible, quasi [992] aversans per iram et odium, as avoiding it with anger and indignation. All affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains, which, although the stoics make light of, we hold natural, and not to be resisted. The good affections are caused by some object of the same nature; and if present, they procure joy, which dilates the heart, and preserves the body: if absent, they cause hope, love, desire, and concupiscence. The bad are simple or mixed: simple for some bad object present, as sorrow, which contracts the heart, macerates the soul, subverts the good estate of the body, hindering all the operations of it, causing melancholy, and many times death itself; or future, as fear. Out of these two arise those mixed affections and passions of anger, which is a desire of revenge; hatred, which is inveterate anger; zeal, which is offended with him who hurts that he loves; and ἐπικαιρεκακία [Greek], a compound affection of joy and hate, when we rejoice at other men's mischief, and are grieved at their prosperity; pride, self-love, emulation, envy, shame, &c., of which elsewhere.
",,9293,•I've included twice: Rule and Subjection and Reins,"""Voluntary, the third, or intellective, which commands the other two in men, and is a curb unto them, or at least should be, but for the most part is captivated and overruled by them; and men are led like beasts by sense, giving reins to their concupiscence and several lusts.""","",2009-09-14 19:34:06 UTC,"First Partition, Sect I. I. Memb. II, Subsect. VIII.--Of the moving Faculty"
6667,"",Reading in Google Books,2010-01-21 20:10:41 UTC,"That although I have but troublesome Kingdoms here, yet I may attaine to that Kingdome of Peace in My Heart, and in thy Heaven, which Christ hath Purchased, and thou wilt give to thy Servant (though a Sinner) for my Saviours sake, Amen.
(p. 6)",,17678,"","""That although I have but troublesome Kingdoms here, yet I may attaine to that Kingdome of Peace in My Heart, and in thy Heaven, which Christ hath Purchased, and thou wilt give to thy Servant (though a Sinner) for my Saviours sake, Amen.""","",2010-01-21 20:10:41 UTC,I. Upon His Majesties calling this last Parliament.
3445,"",Reading,2012-05-16 19:23:05 UTC,"Wherefore the natural measure whereby to judge our doings, is the sentence of Reason, determining and setting down what is good to be done. Which sentence is either mandatory, shewing what must be done; or else permissive, declaring only what may be done; or thirdly admonitory, opening what is the most convenient for us to do. The first taketh place, where the comparison doth stand altogether between doing and not doing of one thing which in itself is absolutely good or evil; as it had been for Joseph to yield or not to yield to the impotent desire of his lewd mistress, the one evil the other good simply. The second is, when of divers things evil, all being not evitable, we are permitted to take one; which one saving only in case of so great urgency were not otherwise to be taken; as in the matter of divorce amongst the Jews. The last, when of divers things good, one is principal and most eminent; as in their act who sold their possessions and laid the price at the Apostles' feet; which possessions they might have retained unto themselves without sin: again, in the Apostle St. Paul's own choice to maintain himself by his own labour; whereas in living by the Church's maintenance, as others did, there had been no offence committed. In Goodness therefore there is a latitude or extent, whereby it cometh to pass that even of good actions some are better than other some; whereas otherwise one man could not excel another, but all should be either absolutely good, as hitting jump that indivisible point or centre wherein goodness consisteth; or else missing it they should be excluded out of the number of well-doers. Degrees of well-doing there could be none, except perhaps in the seldomness and oftenness of doing well. But the nature of Goodness being thus ample, a Law is properly that which Reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the Law of Reason or human Nature is that which men by discourse of natural Reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions.
(I.viii.9)",,19779,"","""And the Law of Reason or human Nature is that which men by discourse of natural Reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions.""","",2012-05-16 19:23:05 UTC,"Book I, Chapter viii"
3445,"",Reading,2012-05-16 19:25:31 UTC,"Laws of Reason have these marks to be known by. Such as keep them resemble most lively in their voluntary actions that very manner of working which Nature herself doth necessarily observe in the course of the whole world. The works of Nature are all behoveful, beautiful, without superfluity or defect; even so theirs, if they be framed according to that which the Law of Reason teacheth. Secondly, those Laws are investigable by Reason, without the help of Revelation supernatural and divine. Finally, in such sort they are investigable, that the knowledge of them is general, the world hath always been acquainted with them; according to that which one in Sophocles observeth concerning a branch of this Law, ""It is no child of to-day's or yesterday's birth, but hath been no man knoweth how long sithence."" It is not agreed upon by one, or two, or few, but by all. Which we may not so understand, as if every particular man in the whole world did know and confess whatsoever the Law of Reason doth contain; but this Law is such that being proposed no man can reject it as unreasonable and unjust. Again, there is nothing in it but any man (having natural perfection of wit and ripeness of judgment) may by labour and travail find out. And to conclude, the general principles thereof are such, as it is not easy to find men ignorant of them, Law rational therefore, which men commonly use to call the Law of Nature, meaning thereby the Law which human Nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound unto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the Law of Reason; this Law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the light of their natural understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may know, to be beseeming or unbeseeming, virtuous or vicious, good or evil for them to do.
(I.viii.9)",,19780,"","""And to conclude, the general principles thereof are such, as it is not easy to find men ignorant of them, Law rational therefore, which men commonly use to call the Law of Nature, meaning thereby the Law which human Nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound unto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the Law of Reason; this Law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the light of their natural understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may know, to be beseeming or unbeseeming, virtuous or vicious, good or evil for them to do.""","",2012-05-16 19:25:31 UTC,"Book I, Chapter viii"