text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"Verse 457. Not half so loud , &c.]
The Poet having ended the Episode of Jupiter and Juno , returns to the Battel, where the Greeks being animated and led on by Neptune , renew the Fight with Vigour. The Noise and Outcry of this fresh Onset, he endeavours to express by these three sounding Comparisons; as if he thought it necessary to awake the Reader's Attention, which by the preceding Descriptions might be lull'd into a Forgetfulness of the Fight. He might likewise design to shew how soundly Jupiter slept, since he is not awak'd by so terrible an Uproar.
This Passage cannot be thought justly liable to the Objections which have been made against heaping Comparisons one upon another, whereby the principal Object is lost amidst too great a Variety of different Images. In this Case the principal Image is more strongly impress'd on the Mind by a Multiplication of Similes, which are the natural Product of an Imagination labouring to express something very vast: But finding no single Idea sufficient to answer its Conceptions, it endeavours by redoubling the Comparisons to supply this Defect: the different Sounds of Waters, Winds, and Flames being as it were united in one. We have several Instances of this sort even in so castigated and reserv'd a Writer as Virgil , who has joined together the Images of this Passage in the 4th Georgic , V. 261. and apply'd them, beautifully softened by a kind of Parody, to the buzzing of a Beehive.
Frigidus ut quondam sylvis immurmurat Auster,
Ut mare sollicitum stridet refluentibus undis,
Æstuat ut clausis rapidus fornacibus ignis.
Tasso has not only imitated this particular Passage of Homer , but likewise added to it.
Cant. 9. St. 22.
Rapido si che torbida procella
De cavernosi monti esce piu tarda:
Fiume, ch' alberi insieme, e case svella:
Folgore, che le torri abbatta, & arda:
Terremoto, che'l mondo empia d'horrore,
Son picciole sembianze al suo furore.
",2009-09-14 19:35:24 UTC,"""In this Case the principal Image is more strongly impress'd on the Mind by a Multiplication of Similes, which are the natural Product of an Imagination labouring to express something very vast.""",2003-10-26 00:00:00 UTC,"","",,Impression,"•INTEREST. Similes are the ""natural Product of an Imagination labouring to express something very vast""",HDIS,10928,4209
"Verse 815. Three Ships with Nireus.]
This Leader is no where mention'd but in these Lines, and is an Exception to the Observation of Macrobius that all the Persons of the Catalogue make their Appearance afterwards in the Poem.Homer himself gives us the reason, because Nireus had but a small Share of Worth and Valour; his Quality only gave him a Privilege to be nam'd among Men. The Poet has caused him to be remember'd no less than Achilles orUlysses , but yet in no better manner than he deserv'd, whose only Qualification was his Beauty: 'Tis by a bare Repetition of his Name three times, which just leaves some Impression of him on the Mind of the Reader. Many others, of as trivial Memory as Nireus, have been preserv'd by Poets from Oblivion; but few Poets have ever done this Favour to Want of Merit with so much Judgment. Demetrius Phalereus peri ErmhneiaV , Sect. 61. takes notice of this beautiful Repetition, which in a just Deference to so delicate a Critick is here preserv'd in the Translation.",2009-09-14 19:35:26 UTC,"""'Tis by a bare Repetition of his Name three times, which just leaves some Impression of him on the Mind of the Reader""",2005-05-16 00:00:00 UTC,"","",,Impression,"•Footnote to following lines: ""Three Ships with Nireus sought the Trojan Shore, / Nireus, whom Agläe to Charopus bore, / Nireus, in faultless Shape, and blooming Grace""","Searching ""mind"" and ""impression"" in HDIS (Poetry)",10968,4209
"Verse 135. Me too ye Warriors hear, &c.]
We may observe what care Homer takes to give every one his proper Character, and how this Speech of Menelaus is adapted to the Laconick; which the better to comprehend, we may remember there are in Homer three Speakers of different Characters, agreeable to the three different kinds of Eloquence. These we may compare with each other in one Instance, supposing them all to use the same Heads, and in the same Order.
The Materials of the Speech are, The manifesting his Grief for the War, with the hopes that it is in his Power to end it; an Acceptance of the propos'd Challenge; an Account of the Ceremonies to be us'd in the League; and a Proposal of a proper Caution to secure it.
Now had Nestor these Materials to work upon, he would probably have begun with a Relation of all the Troubles of the nine Year's Siege which he hop'd he might now bring to an end; he would court their Benevolence and good Wishes for his Prosperity with all the Figures of Amplification; while he accepted the Challenge, he would have given an Example to prove that the single Combate was a wise, gallant, and gentle way of ending the War, practis'd by their Fathers; in the Description of the Rites he would be exceeding particular; and when he chose to demand the Sanction of Priam rather than of his Sons, he would place in Opposition on one side the Son's Action which began the War, and on the other the Impressions of Concern or Repentance which it must by this time have made in the Father's Mind, whose Wisdom he would undoubtedly extol as the effect of his Age. All this he would have expatiated upon with Connexions of the Discourses in the most evident manner, and the most easy, gliding, undisobliging Transitions. The Effect would be, that the People would hear him with Pleasure.
Had it been Ulysses who was to make the Speech, he would have mention'd a few of their most affecting Calamities in a pathetick Air; then have undertaken the Fight with testifying such a chearful Joy, as should have won the Hearts of the Soldiers to follow him to the Field without being desired. He would have been exceeding cautious in wording the Conditions; and solemn rather than particular in speaking of the Rites, which he would only insist on as an Opportunity to exhort both sides to a fear of the Gods, and a strict regard of Justice. He would have remonstrated the use of sending for Priam; and (because no Caution could be too much) have demanded his Sons to be bound with him. For a Conclusion he would have us'd some noble Sentiment agreeable to a Heroe, and (it may be) have enforc'd it with some inspirited Action. In all this you would have known that the Discourse hung together, but its Fire would not always suffer it to be seen in cooler Transitions, which (when they are too nicely laid open) may conduct the Reader, but never carry him away. The People would hear him with Emotion.
These Materials being given to Menelaus, he but just mentions their Troubles, and his Satisfaction in the Prospect of ending them, shortens the Proposals, says a Sacrifice is necessary, requires Priam's Presence to confirm the Conditions, refuses his Sons with a Resentment of that Injury he suffer'd by them, and concludes with a Reason for his Choice from the Praise of Age, with a short Gravity, and the Air of an Apothegm. This he puts in order without any more Transition than what a single Conjunction affords. And the effect of the Discourse is, that the People are instructed by it in what is to be done.",2009-09-14 19:35:26 UTC,"""[H]e would place in Opposition on one side the Son's Action which began the War, and on the other the Impressions of Concern or Repentance which it must by this time have made in the Father's Mind.""",2005-05-16 00:00:00 UTC,"","",,Impression,"•Footnote to following lines: ""Me too ye Warriors hear, whose fatal Right""","Searching ""mind"" and ""impression"" in HDIS (Poetry)",10969,4209
"Verse 164. And thy Heart waste with life-consuming Woe.]
This Expression in the Original is very particular. Were it to be translated literally it must be render'd, how long wilt thou eat, or prey upon thy own Heart by these Sorrows? And it seems that it was a common way of expressing a deep Sorrow; and Pythagoras uses it in this Sense, mh esqiein kardian, that is, grieve not excessively, let not sorrow make too great an Impression upon thy Heart.
Eustathius.",2009-09-14 19:35:26 UTC,"One should ""grieve not excessively, let not sorrow make too great an Impression upon thy Heart.""",2005-05-16 00:00:00 UTC,"","",,Impression,"•Footnote to following lines: ""How long, unhappy! shall thy Sorrows flow/ And thy Heart waste with life-consuming Woe?""","Searching ""heart"" and ""impression"" in HDIS (Poetry)",10970,4209
"36. Thus much concerning your Method of Proving by Explicating; or rather, of substituting Explications in the place of Proofs. As for the other part of your Method, which is, your putting Learners to Meditate long and seriously, upon what you have propos'd to them, I lik'd that as ill as I did that of Explicating: And, my Reason is, because, unless Men take Principles along with them, to guide their Thoughts right, and keep an Attentive Eye to them, while they thus Meditate; 'tis to be fear'd, their long Meditating will, by its frequent Dints, so imprint and fix what you have told them, in their Brain; and, at length, make it sink so deep into their Minds, that, whether it be Right or Wrong, it will stick there, as daily Experience shews us; Custom, a Second Nature, having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding, to imbue us with False Impressions, by the oft-reiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable; especially, Ingenious Explications (as was shewn lately) too often serving for Reasons, to those who are not well vers'd in True Logick.
(pp. 77-8)",2013-04-02 02:43:26 UTC,"""And, my Reason is, because, unless Men take Principles along with them, to guide their Thoughts right, and keep an Attentive Eye to them, while they thus Meditate; 'tis to be fear'd, their long Meditating will, by its frequent Dints, so imprint and fix what you have told them, in their Brain; and, at length, make it sink so deep into their Minds, that, whether it be Right or Wrong, it will stick there, as daily Experience shews us; Custom, a Second Nature, having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding, to imbue us with False Impressions, by the oft-reiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable; especially, Ingenious Explications (as was shewn lately) too often serving for Reasons, to those who are not well vers'd in True Logick.""",2013-04-02 02:43:26 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20088,7370
"43 First then, 'tis so certainly known, that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia, or, (as they say,) run on four Feet, that it is grown Proverbial; which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common. 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things, to Immaterial, are particularly liable to this Defect. They may, indeed, oft times, serve to illustrate some Truth, as fit Metaphors to sute with our Fancy; but then they presuppose the Truth, which they are to illustrate, to be known some other Way. Whence, unless this be done first, all they can do is to explicate we know not what, which destroys the nature of an Explication; for, Explications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point, but suppose it. 3. All the Actions of our Soul are, or ought to be Rational; and have a Dependence on one another, by the way of Reason gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded. Now, I think, 'tis impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius's Meditations, but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his, are reducible to this Enthymem; [For these and these Reasons, there can no Certainty be had, as to Speculative Knowledges, by any Information had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses; therefore, it ought to be sought for in some Interiour Act of our Mind, which is most Comprehensive and Peculiar to it,] which he concieved was Cogitation; and thence he laid this First Principle: [Cogito ergo sum] Which being so, it follows necessarily, that the Laying this for his First Principle, depended on the Goodness of the Reasons he had, why our Senses were not to be trusted, nor could give us our First Notions; whence, by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity, we might have those Self-evident, and First Truths, of ours. This, I say, was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information, conclude; but that, notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have follow'd: Nor, could he have had any Ground for recurring to the Interiour Act of Cogitation, for his First Principle, in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses, as was now declar'd. 4. It being then evident, that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summ'd up in the Enthymem now mention'd, 'tis manifest, that this Explication of yours falters in the main Particular, in which it ought to sute, and resemble. For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul. So that your Similitude is, in effect, the Begging the whole Question; and can have no Force at all, but by our Granting it; which, I see plainly, we shall never have Reason to do. Rather, unless this Petitio Principii (which is tacitly involv'd in this Parallel) be yielded by us, or prov'd by you, it makes against your selves. For, by Denying all such certain Information from the Senses, you will be found, not to remove the Rubbish, in order to lay the Foundation; but, to stop up the Way to the laying any; and, to damm up all the Holes, by which the Materials could come into our Minds, where only such a Foundation could have been laid. At least, you see, your Explication amounts to nothing; and, that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs, and has not one Sure Foot to stand on. Which will, I hope, sufficiently inform others, that this Way of Explicating, so mightily affected by Cartesius, and his Followers, is utterly Insignificant. I shall hope too, that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers, who are so Intelligent, as to discern, that this Explicative Way is taken up, to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof; which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles.
(pp. 94-8)",2013-04-02 02:46:44 UTC,"""This, I say, was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information, conclude; but that, notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have follow'd.""",2013-04-02 02:46:44 UTC,"","",,"","",Reading,20090,7370
"43 First then, 'tis so certainly known, that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia, or, (as they say,) run on four Feet, that it is grown Proverbial; which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common. 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things, to Immaterial, are particularly liable to this Defect. They may, indeed, oft times, serve to illustrate some Truth, as fit Metaphors to sute with our Fancy; but then they presuppose the Truth, which they are to illustrate, to be known some other Way. Whence, unless this be done first, all they can do is to explicate we know not what, which destroys the nature of an Explication; for, Explications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point, but suppose it. 3. All the Actions of our Soul are, or ought to be Rational; and have a Dependence on one another, by the way of Reason gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded. Now, I think, 'tis impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius's Meditations, but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his, are reducible to this Enthymem; [For these and these Reasons, there can no Certainty be had, as to Speculative Knowledges, by any Information had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses; therefore, it ought to be sought for in some Interiour Act of our Mind, which is most Comprehensive and Peculiar to it,] which he concieved was Cogitation; and thence he laid this First Principle: [Cogito ergo sum] Which being so, it follows necessarily, that the Laying this for his First Principle, depended on the Goodness of the Reasons he had, why our Senses were not to be trusted, nor could give us our First Notions; whence, by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity, we might have those Self-evident, and First Truths, of ours. This, I say, was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information, conclude; but that, notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have follow'd: Nor, could he have had any Ground for recurring to the Interiour Act of Cogitation, for his First Principle, in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses, as was now declar'd. 4. It being then evident, that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summ'd up in the Enthymem now mention'd, 'tis manifest, that this Explication of yours falters in the main Particular, in which it ought to sute, and resemble. For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul. So that your Similitude is, in effect, the Begging the whole Question; and can have no Force at all, but by our Granting it; which, I see plainly, we shall never have Reason to do. Rather, unless this Petitio Principii (which is tacitly involv'd in this Parallel) be yielded by us, or prov'd by you, it makes against your selves. For, by Denying all such certain Information from the Senses, you will be found, not to remove the Rubbish, in order to lay the Foundation; but, to stop up the Way to the laying any; and, to damm up all the Holes, by which the Materials could come into our Minds, where only such a Foundation could have been laid. At least, you see, your Explication amounts to nothing; and, that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs, and has not one Sure Foot to stand on. Which will, I hope, sufficiently inform others, that this Way of Explicating, so mightily affected by Cartesius, and his Followers, is utterly Insignificant. I shall hope too, that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers, who are so Intelligent, as to discern, that this Explicative Way is taken up, to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof; which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles.
(pp. 94-8)",2013-04-02 02:50:10 UTC,"""For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul.""",2013-04-02 02:50:10 UTC,"","",,Throne,INTEREST. REVISIT. META-METAPHORICAL.,Reading,20091,7370
"I can't return from so agreeable an entertainment as yours in the country without acknowledging it. I thank you heartily for the new idea of life you there gave me; it will remain long with me, for it is very strongly impressed upon my imagination. I repeat the memory of it often, and shall value that faculty of the mind now more than ever, for the power it gives me of being entertained in your villa, when absent from it. As you are possessed of all the pleasures of the country, and as I think of a right mind, what can I wish you but health to enjoy them? This I so heartily do, that I should be even glad to hear your good old mother might lose all her present pleasures in her unwearied care of you, by your better health convincing her it is unnecessary.
(From Mr. Digby, Aug. 14, 1723, L140, pp. 192-3)",2013-07-08 17:14:58 UTC,"""I thank you heartily for the new idea of life you there gave me; it will remain long with me, for it is very strongly impressed upon my imagination.""",2013-07-08 17:14:58 UTC,Letter CXI,"",,Impressions,"",Reading in Google Books,21519,7508
"The same Author, in the same Book, writes more of the said Contest as follows.* Superstition, and Despair of Eternal Salvation are wont to imprint on the sensitive Soul, the Blood and Body, in a manner the like affects of Melancholy, as Love and Jealousie, tho' some way after a different manner of affecting; for in the former, the Object whose getting or loss is in danger, is wholly Immateral, and its design being first conceiv'd by the Rational Soul, is Imprinted on the Corporeal; in the prosecution of which, if this readily obeys, then no Perturbation of a Man's Mind arises; but if the Corporeal Soul withstanding, as it often happens, the Rational still insists with Admonitions and Threats, presently the other growing hot, moves the Blood and Spirits after a disorderly manner, opposes Corporeal Goods and Pleasures, to the Spiritual presented by the Understanding, and endeavours to draw the Man to her side; and as thus there is a continual struggle betwixt the two Souls, and sometimes the Will is Superior, sometimes the sensitive Appetite prevails; at length a Court of Conscience is erected by the Mind, where all particular Acts are scrupulously examined, by reason of these frequent Variances of the Souls, the Animal Spirits, as being too much, and in a manner perpetually exercised, and being commanded here and there contrary ways, and almost distracted, fall somewhat at length from their Vigour, and Natural Disposition, and at last being rendred fixt and melancholick, as they are detained from their wonted Expansion, they frame out of Course, and unusal traces in the Brain, and so cause a Delirium, with an excess of Fear and Sadness. In those kinds of affects, the Corporeal Soul being carryed away, as it were by Violence, both Divorces it self from the Body, and being modified according to the Character of the Idea imprinted, is wont to take a New Species, either Angelical, or Diabolical; mean while the Understanding, inasmuch as the Imagination suggests to it only discorderly and monstrous Notions, is wholly perverted from the use of the right Reason.
(X, pp. 319-20)
*. Dissert. 2. c. d' Melanc.",2013-11-10 19:16:10 UTC,"""Superstition, and Despair of Eternal Salvation are wont to imprint on the sensitive Soul, the Blood and Body, in a manner the like affects of Melancholy, as Love and Jealousie, tho' some way after a different manner of affecting; for in the former, the Object whose getting or loss is in danger, is wholly Immateral, and its design being first conceiv'd by the Rational Soul, is Imprinted on the Corporeal; in the prosecution of which, if this readily obeys, then no Perturbation of a Man's Mind arises.""",2013-11-10 19:10:47 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",Searching in ECCO-TCP,23161,7626
"The same Author, in the same Book, writes more of the said Contest as follows.* Superstition, and Despair of Eternal Salvation are wont to imprint on the sensitive Soul, the Blood and Body, in a manner the like affects of Melancholy, as Love and Jealousie, tho' some way after a different manner of affecting; for in the former, the Object whose getting or loss is in danger, is wholly Immateral, and its design being first conceiv'd by the Rational Soul, is Imprinted on the Corporeal; in the prosecution of which, if this readily obeys, then no Perturbation of a Man's Mind arises; but if the Corporeal Soul withstanding, as it often happens, the Rational still insists with Admonitions and Threats, presently the other growing hot, moves the Blood and Spirits after a disorderly manner, opposes Corporeal Goods and Pleasures, to the Spiritual presented by the Understanding, and endeavours to draw the Man to her side; and as thus there is a continual struggle betwixt the two Souls, and sometimes the Will is Superior, sometimes the sensitive Appetite prevails; at length a Court of Conscience is erected by the Mind, where all particular Acts are scrupulously examined, by reason of these frequent Variances of the Souls, the Animal Spirits, as being too much, and in a manner perpetually exercised, and being commanded here and there contrary ways, and almost distracted, fall somewhat at length from their Vigour, and Natural Disposition, and at last being rendred fixt and melancholick, as they are detained from their wonted Expansion, they frame out of Course, and unusal traces in the Brain, and so cause a Delirium, with an excess of Fear and Sadness. In those kinds of affects, the Corporeal Soul being carryed away, as it were by Violence, both Divorces it self from the Body, and being modified according to the Character of the Idea imprinted, is wont to take a New Species, either Angelical, or Diabolical; mean while the Understanding, inasmuch as the Imagination suggests to it only discorderly and monstrous Notions, is wholly perverted from the use of the right Reason.
(X, pp. 319-20)
*. Dissert. 2. c. d' Melanc.",2013-11-10 19:15:42 UTC,"""In those kinds of affects, the Corporeal Soul being carryed away, as it were by Violence, both Divorces it self from the Body, and being modified according to the Character of the Idea imprinted, is wont to take a New Species, either Angelical, or Diabolical; mean while the Understanding, inasmuch as the Imagination suggests to it only discorderly and monstrous Notions, is wholly perverted from the use of the right Reason.""",2013-11-10 19:15:42 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",ECCO-TCP,23164,7626