work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
4762,"",Searching in ECCO,2006-10-19 00:00:00 UTC,"[...] Nature gives us Talents, it is Education that applies them right or wrong. Nature bestows Propensions and Affections, which may be directed to Good, either public or private. 'Tis Culture that improves or perverts them. The infant Mind is ductile like Wax; you may stamp a fair or ugly Impression upon it, Error or Knowledge, Indolence or Application, Virtue or Vice. What makes little Miss, who is is admired, caressed and flattered, the pert imperious Dame, but the early Incense offered to her Vanity? Why does Master, when he comes of Age, turn out so stubborn and insolent, an abandoned Rake or wretched Spendthrift, but the Good-nature of doating Parents, or the Mismanagement of Tutors, or the Company he falls into? [...]
(vol I, pp. 179)",2010-10-10,12608,•I've included twice: Wax and Stamp,"""The infant Mind is ductile like Wax; you may stamp a fair or ugly Impression upon it, Error or Knowledge, Indolence or Application, Virtue or Vice.""",Impressions,2011-10-10 16:02:27 UTC,Dialogue VIII
5345,"",Searching in Google Books,2011-09-29 18:12:25 UTC,"[...] Is it possible to imagine, that any course of education could ever bring a rational creature to believe, that two and two are equal to three, and that he is not the same person to-day he was yesterday, that the ground he stands on does not exist? could make him disbelieve the testimony of his own senses, or that of other men? could make him expect unlike events in like circumstances? or that the course of nature, of which he has hitherto had experience, will be changed even when he foresees no cause to hinder its continuance? I can no more believe, that education could produce such a depravity of judgment, than that education could make me see all human bodies in an inverted position, or hear with my nostrils, or take pleasure in burning or cutting my flesh. Why should not our judgments concerning truth be acknowledged to result from a bias impressed upon the mind by its Creator, as well as our desire of self-preservation, our love of society, our resentment of injury, our joy in the possession of good? If those judgments be not instinctive, I should be glad to know how they come to be universal: the modes of sentiment and behaviour produced by education are uniform, only where education is uniform; but there are many truths which have obtained universal acknowledgement in all ages and nations. If those judgments be not instinctive, I should be glad to know how men find it so difficult, or rather impossible, to lay them aside: the false opinions we imbibe from habit and education, may be, and often are, relinquished by those who make a proper use of their reason; and the man who thus renounces former prejudices, upon conviction of their falsity, is applauded by all as a man of candour, sense, and spirit; but if one were to suffer himself to be argued out of his common sense, the whole world would pronounce him a fool.
(II.ii.1, pp. 258-60)",,19246,"","""Why should not our judgments concerning truth be acknowledged to result from a bias impressed upon the mind by its Creator, as well as our desire of self-preservation, our love of society, our resentment of injury, our joy in the possession of good?""",Impressions,2011-09-29 18:12:25 UTC,"Part II, Chap. ii, Sect 1"
5033,"",Reading,2012-07-28 13:33:25 UTC,"Since, therefore, the mind of man appears of so loose and unsteddy a contexture, that, even at present, when so many persons find an interest in continually employing on it the chissel and the hammer, yet are they not able to engrave theological tenets with any lasting impression; how much more must this have been the case in antient times, when the retainers to the holy function were so much fewer in comparison? No wonder, that the appearances were then very inconsistent, and that men, on some occasions, might seem determined infidels, and enemies to the established religion, without being so in reality; or at least, without knowing their own minds in that particular.
(p. 84)",,19903,"","""Since, therefore, the mind of man appears of so loose and unsteddy a contexture, that, even at present, when so many persons find an interest in continually employing on it the chissel and the hammer, yet are they not able to engrave theological tenets with any lasting impression; how much more must this have been the case in antient times, when the retainers to the holy function were so much fewer in comparison?""",Impressions and Writing,2012-07-28 13:34:19 UTC,""
7486,"",Reading in C-H Lion,2013-06-27 18:36:48 UTC,"There are chiefly four perfections of which memory is capable. These are rarely united in the same person; and the prevalence of one of them, or the manner and degree in which they are united, produces very great diversities in the memories of different persons. Some of the perfections of memory arise from the strength with which separate perceptions are remembered, others from the ability of remembering their connexions firmly.--It is a perfection of memory to be susceptible, to receive an impression quickly: it is likewise a perfection of memory to be tenacious. Both these perfections arise chiefly from a fitness for remembering separate perceptions: but they do not always go together; nay, they who commit a thing quickly to memory, generally forget it soonest. This may seem to contradict the maxim, that perceptions originally strong, are firmly remembered. But it is perfectly consistent with it. Because the impression is made quickly, it does not follow that it is strong: a susceptible memory, like a soft body, receives some impression at once, and because this impression is perceivable at once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we allow it to continue slight: when the memory is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the impression is not made without continued labour, it is deep before it can be at all taken notice of, and therefore it is permanent. Sometimes these perfections are united: the memory is of such a happy temperature as may be compared to wax, which receives the seal easily and strongly when it is melted, and immediately hardens and suffers it not to be effaced. Of these two perfections, the former is in its nature and principles most congenial to genius; but the latter is at least equally subservient to its operations; for no perception can be suggested by fancy or applied to any purpose, except it be remembered.--It is a perfection of memory to be distinct, to exhibit things in their proper form and order: it is also a perfection to be ready, to call to mind easily and quickly such ideas as we have occasion for. Distinctness relates to such things as are in our view together; readiness, to such as make their appearance in succession. They are inseparable, and always take place almost in the same degree. They arise from the same principle, from a natural aptitude to retain the relations of things. The memory cannot indeed be distinct, except the several separate perceptions be well retained; the omission of one part or member would destroy the harmony of the whole: but distinctness arises immediately from a lively remembrance of their connexions; if this were wanting, all the particulars would lie jumbled in confusion. It is, in like manner, when the connexions of things are strongly perceived, that some of them introduce others readily. If in some cases there be distinctness of remembrance without readiness of recollection, the defect in this latter virtue is owing to the weakness and inactivity of imagination, failing to exert itself at the proper time. In proportion to the degree in which these perfections of memory are possessed, they must render the energies of genius the more perfect, and likewise affect the form of its productions, so far as it employs in them materials borrowed from memory. Confusion in a work may proceed from indistinctness of remembrance, as well as from irregularity of imagination: not only feebleness of imagination, but also slowness of recollection, may render a work both laborious and meagre. Besides these defects, confusion and slowness, which are directly opposed to the excellences of memory now under consideration, there is an imperfection which bears a relation to both these excellences, which seems to resemble them, but in truth only mimics them; I mean, the remembrance of things merely by rote, when a person can run over things exactly, in their observed order, and be certain of recollecting any part of them by thus running over them, but can remember nothing, if he be put out of that train. In this case, the separate perceptions are faintly impressed upon the mind, their experienced connexions strongly; and these are the only connexions which influence it, the relations conferred by imagination have none; the subject likewise is not clearly understood. These being the causes of this peculiarity of memory, it can seldom be found along with genius, or indeed with a great degree of any of the intellectual powers.
(II.ix, pp. 269-272)",,21205,"","""Because the impression is made quickly, it does not follow that it is strong: a susceptible memory, like a soft body, receives some impression at once, and because this impression is perceivable at once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we allow it to continue slight: when the memory is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the impression is not made without continued labour, it is deep before it can be at all taken notice of, and therefore it is permanent.""",Impressions,2013-06-27 18:36:48 UTC,""
7486,"",Reading in C-H Lion,2013-06-27 18:38:23 UTC,"There are chiefly four perfections of which memory is capable. These are rarely united in the same person; and the prevalence of one of them, or the manner and degree in which they are united, produces very great diversities in the memories of different persons. Some of the perfections of memory arise from the strength with which separate perceptions are remembered, others from the ability of remembering their connexions firmly.--It is a perfection of memory to be susceptible, to receive an impression quickly: it is likewise a perfection of memory to be tenacious. Both these perfections arise chiefly from a fitness for remembering separate perceptions: but they do not always go together; nay, they who commit a thing quickly to memory, generally forget it soonest. This may seem to contradict the maxim, that perceptions originally strong, are firmly remembered. But it is perfectly consistent with it. Because the impression is made quickly, it does not follow that it is strong: a susceptible memory, like a soft body, receives some impression at once, and because this impression is perceivable at once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we allow it to continue slight: when the memory is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the impression is not made without continued labour, it is deep before it can be at all taken notice of, and therefore it is permanent. Sometimes these perfections are united: the memory is of such a happy temperature as may be compared to wax, which receives the seal easily and strongly when it is melted, and immediately hardens and suffers it not to be effaced. Of these two perfections, the former is in its nature and principles most congenial to genius; but the latter is at least equally subservient to its operations; for no perception can be suggested by fancy or applied to any purpose, except it be remembered.--It is a perfection of memory to be distinct, to exhibit things in their proper form and order: it is also a perfection to be ready, to call to mind easily and quickly such ideas as we have occasion for. Distinctness relates to such things as are in our view together; readiness, to such as make their appearance in succession. They are inseparable, and always take place almost in the same degree. They arise from the same principle, from a natural aptitude to retain the relations of things. The memory cannot indeed be distinct, except the several separate perceptions be well retained; the omission of one part or member would destroy the harmony of the whole: but distinctness arises immediately from a lively remembrance of their connexions; if this were wanting, all the particulars would lie jumbled in confusion. It is, in like manner, when the connexions of things are strongly perceived, that some of them introduce others readily. If in some cases there be distinctness of remembrance without readiness of recollection, the defect in this latter virtue is owing to the weakness and inactivity of imagination, failing to exert itself at the proper time. In proportion to the degree in which these perfections of memory are possessed, they must render the energies of genius the more perfect, and likewise affect the form of its productions, so far as it employs in them materials borrowed from memory. Confusion in a work may proceed from indistinctness of remembrance, as well as from irregularity of imagination: not only feebleness of imagination, but also slowness of recollection, may render a work both laborious and meagre. Besides these defects, confusion and slowness, which are directly opposed to the excellences of memory now under consideration, there is an imperfection which bears a relation to both these excellences, which seems to resemble them, but in truth only mimics them; I mean, the remembrance of things merely by rote, when a person can run over things exactly, in their observed order, and be certain of recollecting any part of them by thus running over them, but can remember nothing, if he be put out of that train. In this case, the separate perceptions are faintly impressed upon the mind, their experienced connexions strongly; and these are the only connexions which influence it, the relations conferred by imagination have none; the subject likewise is not clearly understood. These being the causes of this peculiarity of memory, it can seldom be found along with genius, or indeed with a great degree of any of the intellectual powers.
(II.ix, pp. 269-272)",,21206,USE IN ENTRY,"""Sometimes these perfections are united: the memory is of such a happy temperature as may be compared to wax, which receives the seal easily and strongly when it is melted, and immediately hardens and suffers it not to be effaced.""",Impressions,2013-06-27 18:38:23 UTC,""
7492,"",C-H Lion,2013-06-28 16:22:36 UTC,"LORD RANDOLPH.
When was it pure of sadness! These black weeds
Express the wonted colour of thy mind,
For ever dark and dismal. Seven long years
Are pass'd, since we were join'd by sacred ties:
Clouds, all the while have hung upon thy brow,
Nor broke, nor parted by one gleam of joy.
Time, that wears out the trace of deepest anguish,
As the sea smooths the prints made in the sand,
Has past o'er thee in vain.
(Act I, p. 8)",,21270,"","""Time, that wears out the trace of deepest anguish, / As the sea smooths the prints made in the sand, / Has past o'er thee in vain.""",Impressions,2013-06-28 16:22:36 UTC,Act I
7622,"",ECCO-TCP,2013-08-18 04:25:48 UTC,"AEMILIUS
Besides the five Senses, the Naturalists generally speak of a Sensorium, or common Sense, which they reckon the ground of all Sensation, or a Medium, as it were, for modifying the Impressions and conveying them to the Mind. The Eye, say they, knows not that it sees, nor the Ear that it hears, till this common Sense interposes its Verdict.
This makes no addition to the number of our Senses, whether it be granted or denied; it only serves, as a new Instrument, to account in some dark manner for their Operations. And perhaps it is owing to this Medium or Canal, among other things, that having two Eyes and two Ears we do not see nor hear double.
(p. 31)",,22324,"","""Besides the five Senses, the Naturalists generally speak of a Sensorium, or common Sense, which they reckon the ground of all Sensation, or a Medium, as it were, for modifying the Impressions and conveying them to the Mind.""",Impressions,2013-08-18 04:25:48 UTC,""
7674,"",Searching in ECCO-TCP,2013-09-16 03:12:48 UTC,"A COMPARISON instituted betwixt moral and physical necessity may possibly throw additional light upon this subject. Where the motives to any action are perfectly full, cogent and clear, the feeling of liberty, as we showed before, entirely vanishes. In other cases, where the field of choice is wider, and where opposite motives counterbalance and work against each other, the mind fluctuates for a while, and feels itself more loose: but, in the end, must as necessarily be determined to the side of the most powerful motive, as the balance, after several vibrations; must incline to the side of the preponderating weight. The laws of mind, and the laws of matter, are in this respect perfectly similar; tho', in making the comparison, we are apt to deceive ourselves. In forming a notion of physical necessity, we seldom think of any force, but what has visibly a full effect. A man in prison, or tied to a post, must remain there. If he is dragged along, he cannot resist. Whereas motives, which, from the highest to the lowest, are very different, do not always produce sensible effects. Yet, when the comparison is accurately instituted, the very same thing holds in the actions of matter. A weak motive makes some impression: but, in opposition to one more powerful, it has no effect to determine the mind. In the precise same manner, a small force will not overcome a great resistance; nor the weight of an ounce in one scale, counter-balance a pound in the other. Comparing together the actions of mind and matter, similar causes will, in both equally, produce similar effects.
(pp. 169-171)",,22736,"","""A weak motive makes some impression: but, in opposition to one more powerful, it has no effect to determine the mind. In the precise same manner, a small force will not overcome a great resistance; nor the weight of an ounce in one scale, counter-balance a pound in the other.""","",2013-09-16 03:12:48 UTC,""
5107,"",Text from ECCO-TCP,2013-11-18 21:50:21 UTC,"The natural rate of succession, depends also in some degree upon the particular perceptions that compose the train. An agreeable object, taking a strong hold of the mind, occasions a slower succession than when the objects are indifferent. Grandeur and novelty fix the attention for a considerable time, excluding all other ideas; and the mind thus occupied feels no vacuity. Some emotions, by hurrying the mind from object to object, accelerate the succession. Where the train is composed of connected objects, the succession is quick. For it is so ordered by nature, that the mind goes easily and sweetly along connected objects*. On the other hand, the succession must be slow where the train is composed of unconnected objects. An unconnected object, finding no ready access to the mind, requires time to make an impression. And that it is not admitted without a struggle, appears from the unsettled state of the mind for some moments after it is presented, wavering betwixt it and the former train. During this short period, one or other of the former objects will intrude, perhaps oftener than once, till the attention be fixt entirely upon the new object. The same observations are applicable to ideas suggested by language. The mind can bear a quick succession of related ideas. But an unrelated idea, for which the mind is not prepared, takes time to make a distinct impression; and therefore a train composed of such ideas, ought to proceed with a slow pace. Hence an epic poem, a play, or any story connected in all its parts, may be perused in a shorter time, than a book of maxims or apothegms, of which a quick succession creates both confusion and fatigue.
(I.ix, pp. 383-5)",,23300,"","""Some emotions, by hurrying the mind from object to object, accelerate the succession. Where the train is composed of connected objects, the succession is quick. For it is so ordered by nature, that the mind goes easily and sweetly along connected objects. On the other hand, the succession must be slow where the train is composed of unconnected objects. An unconnected object, finding no ready access to the mind, requires time to make an impression. And that it is not admitted without a struggle, appears from the unsettled state of the mind for some moments after it is presented, wavering betwixt it and the former train. During this short period, one or other of the former objects will intrude, perhaps oftener than once, till the attention be fixt entirely upon the new object.""",Impressions,2014-07-03 15:24:26 UTC,""
5107,"",ECCO-TCP,2013-11-18 21:51:19 UTC,"The natural rate of succession, depends also in some degree upon the particular perceptions that compose the train. An agreeable object, taking a strong hold of the mind, occasions a slower succession than when the objects are indifferent. Grandeur and novelty fix the attention for a considerable time, excluding all other ideas; and the mind thus occupied feels no vacuity. Some emotions, by hurrying the mind from object to object, accelerate the succession. Where the train is composed of connected objects, the succession is quick. For it is so ordered by nature, that the mind goes easily and sweetly along connected objects*. On the other hand, the succession must be slow where the train is composed of unconnected objects. An unconnected object, finding no ready access to the mind, requires time to make an impression. And that it is not admitted without a struggle, appears from the unsettled state of the mind for some moments after it is presented, wavering betwixt it and the former train. During this short period, one or other of the former objects will intrude, perhaps oftener than once, till the attention be fixt entirely upon the new object. The same observations are applicable to ideas suggested by language. The mind can bear a quick succession of related ideas. But an unrelated idea, for which the mind is not prepared, takes time to make a distinct impression; and therefore a train composed of such ideas, ought to proceed with a slow pace. Hence an epic poem, a play, or any story connected in all its parts, may be perused in a shorter time, than a book of maxims or apothegms, of which a quick succession creates both confusion and fatigue.
(I.ix, pp. 383-5)",,23301,"","""The mind can bear a quick succession of related ideas. But an unrelated idea, for which the mind is not prepared, takes time to make a distinct impression; and therefore a train composed of such ideas, ought to proceed with a slow pace.""",Impressions,2013-11-18 21:51:19 UTC,""